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CONDO DEVELOPERS AND FIDUCIARY
DUTIES: AN UNLIKELY PAIRING?
Alisa M Levin *

INTRODUCTION
There comes a time when many consumers consider
purchasing real estate. Whether eyeing some real property "candy"
down the street, enjoying a neighbor's summer backyard party, or
trading up from studio apartments to trendy downtown condos, we
are all exposed to different types of realty on a daily basis. We all
live somewhere, and we all know someone who has had experiences
with purchasing real estate. In terms of size, affordability and
convenience, the condominium is an increasingly popular option.
With more frequency, we all may know someone who has purchased
a condominium, only to subsequently experience buyer's remorse.
This article examines some issues that create this after-the-fact regret
and discusses what can be done to avoid it.
Condominiums are often located in central areas that are
historically more expensive, allowing purchasers to buy in areas that
they might not otherwise be able to afford. However, like any real
estate, a condominium can come with a number of issues apart from
other types of real estate ventures. Wheh prospective purchasers (and
their attorneys) are evaluating the feasibility of a particular project, or
in the alternative, extricating themselves from one gone bad, the
developer's "fiduciary duty" must be considered.
The condominium developer - the party who builds the
condominium or initially converts it from its prior state, and who is
typically the party responsible for initial sales - has various important
and ongoing fiduciary duties. Even after the first unit owners have
Alisa Levin is a Chicago real estate and litigation attorney and solo
practitioner. Her current practice focuses on matters involving real estate litigation,
construction law, collections, real estate consulting and appellate law.
1 The author wishes to thank Katy Broom of DePaul University College of
Law (L' 11) for her editorial and research assistance; as well as Professor Marshall
Tracht of New York Law School for his editorial assistance.

197

Loyola Consumer Law Review

198

[Vol. 24:2

closed or after turnover when the owners collectively have assumed
the responsibility of ongoing maintenance of common areas within
the development, issues can arise involving the developer's
continuing obligations.
Part I of this Article will provide a history of condominium
creation and explain their trajectory in the United States. Parts II and
III will examine a condominium developer's fiduciary duties and
various ways in which a developer can be liable to incoming
purchasers or condominium unit owners. Part IV provides an
overview of developer beginnings and various issues that may arise
before a sale takes place. Part V explores some common legal actions
against developers. Part VI deals with a uniform law relating to
vacant real estate, which is very common in connection with
developer purchases. Part VII looks at various defenses a developer
might assert in response to legal action. Parts VIII and IX explore the
Restatement (Third) of Property ("Restatement") and the Uniform
Common Interest Community Act, which offer jurisdictions methods
by which to codify condominium laws. While not an examination of
every scenario affecting condominium owners or developers, the sum
of this article's parts is intended to provide a starting point for more
critical examination of the . issues that affect the parties - to
condominium transactions and to highlight pathways for positive
change.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CONDOMINIUMS
Most community associations, such as condominiums and
cooperatives, are created by a developer rather than through direct
agreement of neighboring property owners.2 The developer typically
executes and records a declaration of covenants together with bylaws, which serve as, the governing documents of the community
association and which bind every unit owner upon purchase.3 The
governing documents empower the association board to manage the
association and impose restrictions on owners while overseeing
association affairs, and provide provisions for amendment and the
exercise of power, both of which are tantamount to a community
constitution. While in some cases a copy of this "constitution" is
delivered before purchase so that the prospective buyer can
2 Russell

Zuckerman, Using Good Judicial Judgment: Dispensing with the
Business Judgment Rule in Mixed-Use Community Association Disputes, 81
TEMPLE L. REv. 927, 935 (2008).
3

id.

4id
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investigate the health of the community, usually a copy is delivered
no later than closing. These governing documents serve as the
rulebook for the particular condominium community. In many
instances, homeownership in community associations is more popular
because it is generally cheaper and offers the unit owners the ability
to dispense with typical obligations of homeownership, including
some maintenance and repair.
Regulation of condominium ownership in early years was first
formally outlined in the Code Napoleon of 1804, Article 664, which
addressed separate ownership of floors and maintenance and repair
issues relating to common elements.6 Article 664 provided in part
that:
When the different stories of a home belong to different
proprietors, if the titles of the property do not regulate the
mode of reparations and reconstructions, they must be
made in manner following: The main walls and the roof are
at the charge of all the proprietors, each in proportion to the
value of the story belonging to him. The proprietor of the
first story erects the staircase which conducts to it; the
proprietor of the second story carries the stairs from where
the former ends to his apartments; and so of the rest.7
In the 1920s, France, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands,
Germany and others started to pass legislation designed to clarify the
rights and duties of flat owners, focusing on their responsibilities for
common parts of the building.8
The model for United States condominium law came not from
Europe, but from Puerto Rico. 9 In the 1950s, a housing shortage combined with the high cost of real estate and a shortage of available
land - led to the passage of the Horizontal Property Act in Puerto
Rico.' 0 Following the passage of that act and the United States'
recognition of the condominium form of ownership in the 1961
5

id.

6 Donna

S. Bennett, Condominium Homeownership in the United States: A
Selected Annotated Bibliography of Legal Sources 1 (Jan. 22, 2010), available at

http://ssrn.com/abstract-1493368.
7 Id (citing Code Civil de Francais (the Code Napoleon) §664 (1804); J.
Leyser, Ownership of Flats - A Comparative Study, 7 Int'l L & Comp. L.Q. 33

(1958)).
8

Id. at 2 (citing J. Leyser, Ownership ofFlats - A Comparative Study, 7 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 33, 35 (1958)).
9Id. at 4.
0

Id
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National Housing Act, condominiums sprung up all over America
and legislative bodies began passing laws regulating them."
Noted as early as 1976, an apt reflection on the wry humor
that regrettably is part of current condominium development is the
axiom that "upon turnover of the association to the unit owners, the
first three things they do are raise the assessment, fire the manager
and sue the developer."' 2 This common situation is an unfortunate
testament to the failure of many of the players in the game to
understand the responsibilities that are vested with the initial project
developer and the resultant issues that unit owners and condominium
and community associations inherit. Where each player in the real
estate closing process simply looks at what is in front of him with an
eye toward closing the present file just to get to the next, a lot can be
I
missed, creating problems for all involved.
In taking a birds-eye view of a typical condominium
transaction, a multitude of individuals impact a project, including the
developer, purchaser, architect, engineer, realtor/broker, inspector,
municipal building department employee, attorney, title agent,
insurance agent and lender. Where any one of these parties in a
transaction fails to do his or her job or abrogates a defined duty, the
purchaser can be caught in the crosshairs.
One party who has the capacity to cover many of the bases in
problem-avoidance is the developer. When the developer hits his
mark, tends to his many obligations, and delivers a well-built (or
well-rehabbed) and stable condominium project, his job is usually
done. Conversely, the developer may breach his obligations where
his bottom line is more important than the whole of the project,
causing his failure to (1) appreciate matters dependent upon his
sound judgment, (2) respect and comply with his duties to the
eventual consumers of his condominiums, and/or (3) be honest.
II. THE FIDUCIARY DUTY
A. How FiduciaryDuties Arise and the Condominium Life Cycle

Fiduciary duties arise from both the common law of a
particular jurisdiction and through legal instruments that are created
or drafted by the developer or its counsel in response to certain
Id. at 6 (citing John E. Cribbet, Condominium-Homeownership for

Megalopolis?, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1213, 1218 (1963)).
12Wayne

S. Hyatt & James B. Rhoads, Concepts of Liability in the
Development and Administration of Condominium and Homeowner Associations,
12 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 915, 916 (1976).
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responsibilities of the parties that are inherent in the transaction. This
section examines how the duties arise, what instruments impart the
duties, how the instruments can create contractual obligations, and
how they all can affect the community.
In a typical scenario, a developer or his agents advertise a
condominium as being for sale or upcoming. A prospective purchaser
finds the unit and makes a decision to invest in and purchase the real
estate. It is unusual that in the first instance a purchaser views the
developer as a fiduciary or someone upon whom he or she is
completely dependent. Oftentimes a developer can only sell a small
portion of the whole project before it is completed, opening the door
for problems in completing the project and with attracting buyers. An
incoming purchaser in an incomplete project faces both uncertainty
about whether a developer can and will finish the project, and
whether or not resale is possible if the developer cannot or does not
finish.
In the United States, there is a clear difference of opinion as
to whether a developer has to deliver a completed and nearly perfect
product before the sale. While some jurisdictions require completion
prior to closing, others allow a developer to close either preconstruction or with some unfinished major items, essentially closing
deals with a promise that he'll "get to it." This divergence is one of
the major issues that needs to be addressed by standardization. Where
the law in one jurisdiction requires completion of real estate before
sale and another jurisdiction does not address completion or only
theoretically requires it and/or issuance of a "certificate of
completion," the issue of requirement on one hand and enforcement
on the other can create issues that developers are eager to avoid. The
failure to finish a project touches upon fiduciary duties because so
much of the obligation to finish is essentially the benefit that goes to
the purchasers, regardless of whether there is financial risk to the
developer's entity in doing so. Because it is advantageous to a
developer to sell units before they are complete (thus financing the
project through the sales rather than "pre-paying for the work") the
risk shifts to the buyers to finance the project. This risk-shift. is but
one essence of the fiduciary duty and it requires focus toward the
questions of where and when the duty begins. The laws and court
decisions regarding developer duties and obligations coming out of
different jurisdictions can obviously be very diverse, and the
differences can have far-reaching consequences to developers and
unit purchasers alike.
As condominiums have become a more popular option for
consumers, much scrutiny has been focused on the developer and his
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obligations to his prospective purchasers during the condominium
lifecycle. A condominium lifecycle is composed of three phases: (1)
pre-contract; (2) contract; and (3) post-closing. In the pre-contract
and contract phases, the purchaser's most important job is to
document the particulars of the transaction so that in the post-closing
phase the agreements define the developer's duties with particularity.
Additionally, prospective purchasers in every instance should hire an
attorney for the pre-contract and contract phases and a licensed and
bonded professional inspector to identify and document any issues
with the real estate that may impact the unit or common-areas.
B. Condominium Instruments

While the fiduciary obligations of the developer are inherent
in the transaction, they are sometimes outlined in greater detail in the
condominium instruments or in the related law of condominiums
within the particular jurisdiction of the property. Under some
authorities, a developer may have a fiduciary duty to a condominium
association in the following scenarios: (1) "where it and its
employees controlled the association initially' ' and (2) "where such
owners' association's initial directors fail to exercise their
supervisory and managerial responsibilities and act with a conflict of
interest, they abdicate their obligations as initial directors."' 4 In the
latter situation, the developer can be "individually liable for breach of
[its] basic fiduciary duties of acting in good faith and exercising the
Such abdications of duty,
basic duties of good management.'
intentional or otherwise, may arise out of the conflict of interest
inherent when one person or entity does too much and assumes roles
that fundamentally oppose one another. Since a real estate developer
often wears a multitude of hats, acting as builder, vendor, promoter,
designer, and/or general contractor, conflicts of interest normally
appear which can lead to breaches of fiduciary duties.
When the developer gets past the purchase of the real estate
and "develops" the property, its next task is selling the property units
to a new condominium association that will eventually manage itself.
The selling developer hopes not only to cover costs, but to make
money through the sales. As a starting point in most states, the
developer formally creates the new association and becomes the
13 31 C.J.S. Estates §261 (2011) (citing Raven's Cove Townhomes, Inc. v.
Knuppe Dev. Co., 171 Cal. Rptr. 334 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Governors Grove
Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Hill Dev. Corp., 414 A.2d 1177 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1980)).
14 Id. (citing Raven's Cove Townhomes, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. at 334).
5

Id.
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"initial board," starting the clock on its duties. When unit-owners
become members of the association, they form a board of directors,
taking over the management duties from the developer. However, this
management takeover does not remove all of the developer's duties,
as discussed further below.
"The fiduciary duty of an association board consists of three
elements: (1) the duty of loyalty; (2) the duty to treat all unit owners
fairly and evenly; and (3) the duty of care."46 The duty of loyalty
requires that board members act for the benefit of the association and
not out of personal self-interest.17 The developer who sits on an
association's board of directors has all of the concomitant
responsibility and potential liability of any other member (i.e. unit
owner), and in such cases the effect may be that the developer has
two distinct and separate loyalties:* (1) the operation of the
association; and (2) the development and marketing of the project.' 8
This dual role is what so often creates a conflict of interest, for some
decisions benefit one loyalty at the expense of the other.19
Commonly serving as directors of condominium associations,
developers have a fiduciary responsibility to exercise ordinary care in
performing their duties and are required to act reasonably and in good
faith.20 A "fiduciary" is one who transacts business or handles money
or property for the benefit of another person to whom he stands in a
relation implying and necessitating great confidence, trust, and a high
degree of good faith. 2 1 When the developer is required to act in good
faith and for the benefit of others, a line of demarcation separating
the developer as a businessperson out for profit and a functioning
member of the condominium association is formed. The line is
established at the moment the declaration documents are recorded
and survives the closings of all units until the property is turned over
to unit owners.
C. ContractualDuties
Parties to real estate transactions often do not utilize the
services of legal counsel because it is not the standard practice in
16Zuckerman,

supra note 2, at 940 (citing Vincent Di Lorenzo, New York
Condominium and Cooperative Law § 12:3, at 217-19 (2d ed. 1995, supp. 20072008)).
17id.
18
9 Hyatt

1 Id.

& Rhoads, supranote 12, at 973.

20 See generally 31 C.J.S. Estates
21 Id. (citing Caprer v. Nussbaum,

§ 261 (2011).
825 N.Y.S.2d 55 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)).
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their jurisdiction. Instead, these parties use a title company, relying
on the information provided by the title agent or mortgage loan
officer. However, legal counsel - which can normally be procured for
a relatively minimal cost - is an absolute necessity for all real estate
transactions, including condominium transactions, because the typical
real estate purchaser is less concerned with what the documents say
and more concerned with when he can get the keys to his new unit.
Excitement can easily take over, so the buyer is usually not in the
best position to examine issues involving the obligations of the
developer and the association. The buyer's counsel is, in addition to
the title agent and lender, one of the best parties to ensure appropriate
legal compliance.
In many typical construction contracts, the contractor and
owner decide who will bear the burden if something happens before
or after completion of the project. However, in residential
transactions, this contractual language is scarcely used. Because
contracts for condominiums are often standardized forms drafted by
the developer's counsel, the inclusion of risk-of-loss provisions can
be difficult to negotiate. Nevertheless, language which clearly spells
out the developer's pre- and post-closing obligations and fiduciary
duties should be present in all condominium purchase and sale
contracts, a further illustration of why enlisting the services of an
attorney is important to any condominium purchaser.
Because the tradition of caveat emptor ("let the buyer
beware") has been so ingrained in the law, buyers of condominiums
have found themselves in a quandary when their purchases go awry
or the condominium product does not turn out to be what was
contracted for. For a builder or developer engaged in the business of
selling real estate, the construction and/or sale of real estate is a daily
event. For the buyer, the purchase of real estate is a significant and
unique transaction. In many instances, it is the most important
transaction of a lifetime. Thus, when problems arise and legal action
is instituted, it can be a slap in the face when a unit owner's (or
association's) claim is rejected based upon the old rule of caveat
emptor. As such, it is important not only that the purchaser, his
attorney, and his inspector engage in some very calculated preclosing due-diligence, but that the contractual language reflect the
inherent risk in the transaction.
One way to address these common issues is to standardize the
inspection period of real estate so that the buyer has a fair opportunity
to terminate the contract if the condition of the premises is not on par
with the parties' agreement or understanding. Certain form contracts
provide for an inspection period at or near the time of contracting,
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while others provide for an inspection at or near the time of closing.
The applicable time frame should depend on whether the
condominium is a new construction, resale, or rehabbed property, as
the buyer will need an opportunity to inspect the property both near
the time of contracting and before closing. Where the only provided
inspection window is just before closing, the buyer has usually
already given up their primary residence, set up utilities and
otherwise prepared to move. This influences the buyer's willingness
to move forward with a transaction even when faced with issues
identified in an inspection. Thus, the inclusion of contract language
protecting the buyer from being backed into such a corner just before
closing is essential.
Applying the rule of caveat emptor against an inexperienced
buyer and in favor of a wily and experienced developer has been
called a "manifest denial of justice." 2 2 Indeed, it is a manifest denial
of justice when after purchasing a home and obligating oneself to the
transaction of a lifetime, code violations and plumbing disasters (for
example) force the purchaser to fund considerable repairs without
recourse. However, the reality is that these "manifest denials of
justice" do occur. As such, a condominium buyer must be able to rely
on the builder or developer who sells him a house.2 3 Some courts
suggest that implied warranties will "inhibit the unscrupulous, fly-bynight, or unskilled builder and '...discourage much of the sloppy

work and jerry building that has become perceptible over the
years."' 2 4 Unfortunately, this pro-buyer line of thinking has in recent
years been replaced with a more hard-line approach, allowing an
unfair burden to be shouldered by buyers, who are ill-prepared to take
on hurdles of bad construction, underfunded- condominium and
community associations, and market fluctuations.
D. Community Association
For condominium unit owners, membership in the
condominium or community association (usually an interest
proportionate to one's percentage of ownership in the property as a
whole) is a requirement. Functioning as a "mini-government," the
association almost always provides its members utility services,
maintenance, street and common area lighting, refuse removal, water,
25
insurance, and even storage. All of these functions are financed
Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 415 P.2d 698, 710 (Idaho 1966).
Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275, 1279 (Wyo. 1975).
Capra v. Smith, 372 So. 2d 321, 323 (Ala. 1979).
25 Hyatt & Rhoads, supra note 12, at 918.
22
23
24
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through the assessments or taxes levied upon the members of the
community by the board of directors or other similar body.2 6 As in
any business, the officers and directors of that governing body must
then concern themselves with details such as finances, asset and
property management, taxation, insurance, and employee relations,
among other things.2 7 Where a developer becomes involved in
structuring and initially running these governing boards, liability can
(as it well should) arise when the developer has abandoned or failed
to fully honor his fiduciary duties to the project,.the association, and
its members.
As a result of these considerations then, it is important for
sellers, purchasers, counsel, lenders, title companies and developers
alike (not to mention the judges, juries, and legislatures), to
understand and create a system of uniform applications and systems
for the conveyance of condominiums. This system should focus on
avoiding the pitfalls that can and do often accompany these kinds of
transactions. The rest of this article outlines developer liability in
condominium transactions for fiduciary duty violations and suggests
ways in which these violations can be lessened through stricter, more
uniform legislative and municipal guidelines.
Facing these issues and potential liability, developers, buyers
and courts alike question when the fiduciary duty begins.
Unfortunately, however, there is not a clear-cut answer due to the
different ways states treat condominium law and enforcement. While
various courts have held that the developer's fiduciary duty starts
when the developer begins creating the condominiums and the
association and not when the first sale takes place, 28 there are few
judicial opinions that offer cogent analysis on when the duty begins
and ends. Given that judicial opinions are typically shaped by the
attorneys arguing cases and offering briefs before the various courts,
questions about real estate developers are hardly uniform. This is one
specific place where change is needed. Where laws are not similar,
courts cannot ultimately craft a body of law that outlines prudent
methods of conflict resolution.

III. DEVELOPER LIABILITY
A developer's potential liability does not suddenly end once it
relinquishes control of the condominium or community association to
26

d

27
28

Id. at 919.

1 d. at 975.
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the members. 29 In many cases, problems allegedly caused by the
developer's pre-closing acts or omissions are often not ascertained
until well after the time that control of the owner's association passes
to the owners. 30 . Unit owners and prospective purchasers must
understand that in the case of a condominium development - whether
a new build or rehabbed property - the developer maintains control
until a certain number of units have been sold. Therefore, the issue of
control is paramount in terms of understanding and eyeing breaches
of a fiduciary duty.
Developer liability can arise from actions taken in the preclosing or post-closing periods. If a developer assumes the role of
builder, he is potentially liable for construction defects in the same
manner as any other builder.3 1 Historically, the doctrine of caveat
emptor has led to the purchaser's assumption of all of the risk in real
estate transactions while also placing the duty of inspection and
knowledge squarely on their shoulders. 32 However, the idea that a
purchaser must bear all that risk is slowly evaporating. Developers
are slowly being held more responsible for violations of their
obligations to purchasers.
Who then, is or should be responsible to lead the project after
someone purchases a condominium? The short answer is the
condominium board in cases where the developer cannot or refuses to
do. so. The board is a group of unit owners that is called upon to
manage the property as a whole, including all common areas. But
before all units have been sold, the developer still owns part of the
property. The developer typically assumes the role of board member
directly or through appointed agents. Consequently, duties held by
the board members are tied to duties that flow from the developer to
unit owners. A developer-controlled board, as any other homeowner
association board, then owes a fiduciary duty to unit owners,
although the duty arises from a different origin.3 3

29 Richard E. Kennedy & Ellen H. de Haan, Litigation Involving the
Developer, Homeowners' Associations, and Lenders, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.

J. 1, 2 (2004).
30

Id. at 2-3.

31

d. at 3.

32 Id.

33

Kennedy & de Haan, supra note 29, at 24; see also Robert N. Sandgrund &

Joseph F. Smith, When the Developer Controls the HomeownerAssociation Board:
The Benevolent Dictator?,31 CoLo. LAw 91, 93 (2002).
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A. The Originsof the FiduciaryDuty in Relation to the Developer's
PotentialLiability

While courts and academics often agree about this concept
in general, what is less clear is where the duty originates. The duty's
origin matters because our laws must be crafted with the practical
realities of the real estate end-user in mind. If the players in the
process (the lender, realtor, title company and building inspector)
understand the fiduciary duty, the process will be streamlined aid
will help to ensure a lower likelihood of developer-caused issues. If
no condominium could be sold without the benefit of a municipallymandated inspection geared toward purchaser protection and
complete or finished real estate, fiduciary duty breach issues would
arise far less frequently.
In some situations, the duty attaches once the condominium
project is initiated or created thrQugh the filing of the declaration. In
others, it applies after the sale of a particular unit. Corporate law has
historically been the starting point of fiduciary duty law as applied to
real estate, but when the developer controls the condominium or
community association, the strict scrutiny of trust law (rather than the
business judgment rules of corporate law4 may be applied to the
developer-appointed officers and directors. 4 The association retains
the features of a trust while the developer controls it: "The developer
has dominion and control over the association (trust property), to
carry out the general plan of development (the settlor's instructions),
for the benefit of the association's present and future members (the
beneficiaries)."05 In most cases, the association's creator is also its
controller and is not subject to any direction from its members.3 6
Since the developer and its appointed officers and directors could
easily take advantage of their members under this structure, courts
now subject them to the same rigidly defined duties, high standards
of conduct, and strict scrutiny applied to trustees under the general
principles of trust law.37
How should we differentiate the duty originating in corporate
law from its counterpart in trust law? There is enough overlap that a
dividing line is unnecessary. In general, developer-appointed
members of the board must act with the utmost good faith, for the
34

Kennedy & de Haan, supra note 29, at 24.

3 Id.
3 id.
3 Id. (citing Wayne S. Hyatt & Jo Anne P. Stubblefield, The Identity Crisis of
Community Associations: In Search of The Appropriate Analogy, 27 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 589, 633 (1993)).
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sole good of the beneficiaries of the board's governance, and they are
required to deal with the unit owners impartially." In most
jurisdictions, where the developer's units remain unsold, the
developer must assume the rights and obligations of a unit owner. In
the capacity as owner of unsold condominium interests, the developer
must pay common expenses attaching to those interests, from the date
the. declaration is filed or recorded, even if the construction of the
units and the appurtenant common elements subject to those interests
has not started or is not complete.3 9 Most states and cities where
condominiums and common interest communities are found have
statutes and laws that affect development, ownership and
maintenance of these units, and specific statutes that make mention of
developer obligations.
For example, South Carolina courts have recognized that a
developer stands in a fiduciary relationship with unit owners prior to
the creation of the association and the conveyance of common areas
to the association. 40 There, courts have held that because a purchaser
reposes special confidence in a developer, the latter, in good
conscience, is bound to act in good faith and with due regard to the
former's interests.4 Where that special confidence is or should be
obvious because of the trust needed to complete a transaction, it
should be automatically imputed to the developer and his agents, and
affirmed by the legislature and courts. Further, South Carolina courts
have held that where a developer fails to maintain common areas and
to establish a sufficient fund to maintain those areas until assessments
were adequate, the developer has breached his fiduciary duty toward
the owners and the association. 42 It could therefore be said that the
South Carolina legislature sees the fiduciary duty arising before,
rather than after the sale. This question is one that should be asked by
our legislators and included in the applicable provisions of law.
Legislators and courts are strongly encouraged to define the law's
source when drafting and analyzing it for general application and to
clearly explain where a concept comes from and elaborate when a
fiduciary duty is recognized.

3

3
40

Sandgrund & Smith, supra note 33, at 93.
16 OHIO JuR. 3d Condominiums, Etc. § 13 (2011).
Consiance R. Boken, Developer's Fiduciary Duty to Condominium

Associations,45 S.C. L. REv. 195, 197-98 (1993).
41 Id. at 197 (citing Island Car Wash, Inc. v. Norris, III & Rhodes, 358 S.E. 2d
150 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987)).
42 Id. at 198, (citing Goddard v. Fairways Dev. Gen. P'ship, 426 S.E.2d 828,
832 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993)).
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B. The Developer's Liabilitiesas Initial Officer of the Association

This moves the discussion to homeowners' associations and
their directors. In layman's terms, the developer as the initial creator
of the association has an obligation to dot his I's and cross his T's
(vis-i-vis the building or project as a whole and the bank account
belonging to the master association). A fiduciary relationship may
arise from the nature of the business relationship betweeti the
developer and the unit owners or the nature of the control
relationship.4 3 In a situation where the developer (or his agent) is in
complete control of the association, or in the case where the incoming
unit owners are not interested in managing the association as a whole,
there may be more scrutiny by courts if a given situation ends up in
court." "The principles of fiduciary duty established with business
corporations 'may exist for holding those exercising actual control
over the group's affairs to a duty not to use their power in such a way
as to harm unnecessarily, a substantial interest of a dominated
faction.5"

In most jurisdictions it is well established that absent fraud,
self-dealing and betrayal of trust, directors of condominium
associations (including those that are developer-appointed), are not
personally liable for the decisions they make. Often, the association
has master insurance covering acts or omissions by the board or its
individual members. Although most master building policies do not
state whether the insurance coverage can be used only on a forward
basis (i.e. in favor of the unit-owner board). Similarly, one does not
know if it applies to any director (rather than just some directors or
those included by vote), thus including the initial director/developer
entity in its coverage. It is important to consider that there may not be
uniform coverage or indemnity obligations in connection with the
policy of insurance and it also matters greatly in the event of a breach
of duty, if a breach is allocated to a developer board, or a unit-owner
board.
Similarly, the Uniform Condominium Act (the "Act")
originally drafted to try to create a nationwide system for
condominium administration to be adopted state-by-state, reflects
provisions that impose a different standard of care for developerboards than unit-owner boards, holding the former to a higher
standard.46 Section 3-103 of the Act provides that "higher standards
43

Hyatt & Rhoads, supranote 12, at 923.

4 id.
45
id.
46 Uniform

Condominium Act, §3-103(a)(1980).
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for appointed board members is imposed, because the board is vested
with great power over the property interests of unit owners and great
potential for conflicts of interest exist between owners and
developers.'A 7
C. Unit Owners as Elected Officers of the Association and Their
Relationship to the Developer
On the other hand, elected-directors, who are voted in after
the control of the association has shifted to the unit owners, have
much less potential for experiencing a conflict of interest with other
unit owners or the association.48 This may be because elected unit
owners are community-oriented as opposed to the inwardly-focused
developer-board interest. The conflict of interest may typically be
found on the developer's side, where a higher standard is imposed,
.rather than on the unit owner's side. If an incoming unit owner would
assume the responsibility of board service and be held to a higher
standard of care than the developer (including a fiduciary duty and
the potential exposure to personal liability), it would conceivably be
difficult to find anyone to serve as an association director or officer.4 9
Although the nationwide perspective on condos is similar in
theory, the issue and point is that the lack of uniformity in defining
standards and in putting avoidance measures in place (which can help
to avoid fiduciary duty issues in condo developments) can cause unitowners and prospective purchases to be unsure of how to protect
themselves from developer problems. The issues are not limited to
the pre-contract or post-closing timelines. Indeed, some courts have
held that developers are in breach of fiduciary duties to owners'
associations where they fail to turn over the property in good
condition and they fail to provide enough funds in association
accounts to remedy any problematic conditions.50 This would fall into
the post-closing/pre-turnover period when it is often difficult to
determine who should be in charge. The myriad of issues that can
arise include control of financial accounts, tax returns, maintenance,
collection of assessments, and building and capital improvement
issues, among others. It can also leave a gap filled by the ever-present
fiduciary duty obligation held by the developer. This imposes the
duties of omnipresence and ever-mindfulness over the state of the
47
48

id.
id.

49 id.

Lisa M Pardon, Advising Developers in OperatingCommunity Associations,
77 Wis. LAW. 12, 52 (2004).
50
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union (even while that same developer may be in the process of
preparing his exit scheme).
When evaluating the acts and omissions of developers,
counsel should be aware of the possible legal claims that can be
levied, and the avenues through which they may arise. "A breach of
fiduciary duty cause of action may involve, among other things, the
following: (a) conflict of interest allegation; (b) failure to properly
determine an operating budget (such as an attempt to secure sales by
understating the reserve and operating costs); (c) failure to fund and
maintain an adequate reserve account; or (d) failure to enforce the
association's [declaration, by-laws] or regulations."51 The types of
problems that can arise are as numerous and varied as the
condominiums they involve. Most problems, while involving the
developer in general, start with the common interest community's
financial health.
D. Budgetary Issues Affecting the Developer
One of the major reasons that condominiums are attractive
options for many people is that they are perceived as cheaper than
single-family living. While true in some cases, what may be more
accirate, is that where the community is operating in the black and is
well-managed and well-funded, problems are less likely than where
the opposite is true. Where a developer fails to fund reserves,
implement an operating budget, or insists upon timely payment of
assessments when there are acts or omissions that constitute
abandonment of the traditional rules, those failures may result in
disastrous consequences.
This is especially true where the common areas of a building
are in a state of disrepair. Reserves, as they are known, are forced
savings for inevitable repairs or replacement of major items such as
roofs, exterior siding furniture, fencing, pool resurfacing, driveway,
walkway repair, etc. The idea that "things come up" is an accepted
adage for anyone owning real estate. A lesser recognized concept
though, is that "things will come up and those things result in a
special assessment." New condo buyers rarely approach the concept
of an unknown assessment without some trepidation. What will it be
for? How much will I have to pay and for how long? How much time
will I have to come up with the money? All are common questions,
51 THOMAS E. MILLER & RACHEL M. MILLER, HANDLING CONSTRUCTION
DEFECT CLAIMS: WESTERN STATES 162-163 (3d ed. 1999) (citing Raven's Cove
Townhomes, Inc. v. Knuppe Dev. Co., 171 Cal. Rptr. 334 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)).
52

Id. at 165.
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but yet one can rarely see into the future. This makes developer
responsibility at the pre- and post-contract stages key to making a
determination as to whether or not breaches of a fiduciary nature are
possible and whether those breaches are more likely or not to result in
special assessments to the owners.
Tensions will mount when a developer or other real estate
vendor commits fraud, abandons its obligations, and fails to fulfill
contractual and statutory duties to unit-owners. This scenario in
condominium living, however, is becoming increasingly
commonplace. The focus on the various operating principles and the
participation of the other individuals involved in the closing of the
transaction leaves quite a bit to be examined.
The idea of who has to be the "first responsible" in terms of
condominium development is a key issue. This should be evaluated
more stringently by lenders, title companies, courts, legislators, and
all involved. If municipalities and title companies were properly
watching, no closings would take place where a condominium had
major or minor problems. The developers would have to do better
where "better" is key to closing deals.
In a state that could call itself a leader in condominium law and
statutory codification of developer and board duties, California
(through its Civil Code), requires a condominium association's board
(in certain circumstances) to review condominium financials
quarterly. Although this is uncommon in many states, it represents an
advanced and unit-owner friendly attitude toward common interest
communities. These requirements, while not only considered by
many to be forward thinking, and are often rebuked by others as too
strict, in terms of pre or post-sale requirements in condominium
projects. Like many other states, California has adopted the fiduciary
concept, and it has been explored ad nauseum in its many condorelated reported decisions. The overarching issue or question that
arises then, is what is too strict versus what is too lax when
examining the health of a condominium project, and when is it
appropriate to have that health exam. Arguably, such a review would
be better placed before any closings and before any issues can be
passed along to unit owners and associations, while the developer
still has control and clear responsibility.
E. Inspection andReporting Obligationsof the Developer
Many actions brought by unit owners against a homeowners'
association are for property damages arising from an assertion that
the association failed to repair and maintain the common areas,
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causing damage to units.5 3 To the extent that a declarant-developer
fails to timely investigate, or fails to timely pursue viable claims
against those responsible for the construction defects, liability may
attach for its breach of fiduciary duty and negligence. 54 Similarly,
issues can arise where the developer denies that the problem existed
during his tenure. Because of this, increasingly, condominium
conversions are particularly fertile ground for developer problems
because there is ample room for over or underestimating useful life of
existing building components and the negligent repair or replacement
of necessary building components (such as electrical or mechanical
or plumbing systems).
Although it is still the purchaser's responsibility to inspect
(and utilize the services of a licensed inspector where appropriate),
the developer is still responsible for being aware of the conditions of
all building and system components, so that disclosure can be made
to the prospective- buyer. In these scenarios, it is incumbent on
developers to make it clear to prospective buyers what specific
building components they have touched, improved, remodeled,
installed, etc. in conversion or rehab scenarios. Likewise, an
incoming purchaser should not assume that everything is new, codecompliant, or rehabbed, and should solicit the services of a licensed
home inspector who examines both the particular unit, and the
common areas that are equally owned by all unit owners. Where too
many assumptions are competing with one another, the recipe for
misinformation and failure to investigate can lead to many common
area problems, many of which have their origins in breach of
fiduciary duties. Also, where a five hundred dollar inspection could
reveal whether or not a statement of condition as to a building
component or system was true or untrue, the penny saved could be
the penny earned in terms of avoiding a transaction altogether where
it is apparent that the building's condition is not truly what is or was
represented at the pre-contract or contract phase. It is not uncommon
for a seller of real estate to misstate or try to lessen the impact of an
issue, in order to secure a sale. As such, it is critical that the buyer
take on and fully appreciate what information can be made available
before the mortgage is executed and the closing finalized, rather than
through the hindsight that comes after a problem (or ten) is identified.
This can have the impact of avoiding a purchase where a large
common area issue is found or identified after closing which, in order
5

Kennedy & de Haan, supra note 29, at 29.

54 Sandgrund & Smith, supranote 33, at 94.
" MILLER & MILLER, supra note 51, at 168.
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to repair, will require a special assessment to be levied against the
owners.
As a matter of pre-sale or pre-contract (or even post-closing)
due diligence, not only must an incoming unit-owner board carefully
review the budget when it is first handed down by the developer,
incoming purchasers should be suspect where no property report or
engineer's report exists or is provided by the developer that explains
the condition of all units and common areas. This is because a
corresponding breach of fiduciary duty may be found where the
developer fails to inform himself of the existing state of the building
and its major components, instead assuming the code-compliance of
each, or failing to ascertain the remaining useful life (even in
situations where the original components are not initially in need of
repair or replacement).
In some jurisdictions, there are minimum requirements for
determining when the existence or preparation of a "property report"
(or another similar type report) is called for and when it must be
provided to prospective purchasers, although not all jurisdictions
impose this requirement. This is one area where significant
nationwide agreement and uniformity is necessary. Specifically,
developer parties who sell condominiums should be required to
invest in a professional's independent report, so that there can never
be any argument that the developer was unaware of a particular issue.
Such a requirement could be enforced through the local building
department, along with the title company and attorney who assist in
closing the transaction. If the concept of a property report became a
standard in transactions of this type, then the likelihood of selling
"less than" real estate would decrease, because the seller would not
be able to claim that something was unknown or undiscovered.
Also, where a municipality fails to require the developer to
make himself aware of the actual condition of the building, then it is
all too simple for a developer to refuse to do it - thus creating the
first defense in failure to disclose cases (i.e. "what I didn't see, I
couldn't disclose to a buyer"). Since most disclosure requirements
under the law go to actual knowledge, where a developer or vendor
doesn't know about an adverse condition, then the issue of intentional
conduct makes way for negligent conduct. However, where there is
an affirmative obligation and a defined list of typical building and
system components (i.e. roof, masonry, electrical, HVAC, etc.), and
that list is uniform and it becomes a standard in the industry - and
indeed a standard in every jurisdiction - then no excuse can be
offered by a developer in any case, for the failure to affirmatively
know, inspect, and report on the state of a particular parcel of real
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estate. All too common is the "head in the sand" syndrome coupled
with exculpatory language in a contract which proclaims that what
the builder didn't touch, he doesn't warrant.
The failure to require the developer to know something may
create a scenario where if a developer doesn't inspect the electrical
system, and then doesn't determine it should have been upgraded,
that his failure is tantamount to a false representation that all
electrical systems are code-compliant - when in fact, the opposite
may be true. Is it acceptable that when the purchaser himself makes
this discovery (i.e. that something is false when it should have been
true), that a false or negligent or possibly fraudulent representation
has been made by the developer/seller to the purchaser? In addition to
an unequivocal "yes," the issue is that because the typical contract
cannot protect the parties from every conceivable problem that may
arise (insofar as traditional tort principles are in conflict with
traditional contract principles) there is a gap into which many
unsuspecting purchasers fall - one where an unfulfilled promise of
the "benefit of the bargain" is lost.
Apart from the necessary overhaul and suggested uniformity in
these kinds of transactions, the law should simply catch up with what
is happening on the street. More specifically, the legislature and the
"boots on the ground" municipalities that have the capability of
overseeing real estate conveyances of all kinds could and should
impose requirements of knowledge, disclosure, repair and
responsibility upon the seller of real estate. For example, in the
greater Chicago area, some of the local village ordinances and
practices are far more comprehensive than what is imposed by the
City of Chicago Building Department. This, despite the fact that the
latter is responsible for millions of transactions and the former is only
responsible for a fraction thereof, still suggests that other than the
claim by the larger entity that the task is too costly or time
consuming, it shows that in some instances where a smaller
community has more stringent standards relating to real estate
transactions, its leadership cares more about quality rather than
quantity of those transactions. Thus, the quantity over quality issue
that is so prevalent in larger municipalities begs the question of how
hard it could be to shift from one to the other and at what cost should
that shift be avoided.
F. Does the Business Judgment Rule Protectthe Developer?

"The business judgment rule is one of the most fundamental
doctrines in corporate law . . . [which] is the notion that directors,
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rather than shareholders or judges, manage the business affairs of a
,,56Thsrlasatadiets
This rule operates as a presumption that directors
corporation.
make business decisions on an "informed basis, in good faith and in
the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interest of the
company."5 7 Under the rule, directors are usually free of liability due
to "imprudence or honest errors of judgment" and traditionally, to
overcome the presumption, a plaintiff has to "present sufficient
evidence that a director, or the board as a whole, breached any one of
the triads of their fiduciary duty - good faith, loyalty or due care."58
In the context of residential community associations, a minority of
jurisdictions apply the business judgment rule with a majority using a
"reasonableness" standard.59 This is where some cogent analysis may
be necessary - because a determination should be made globally, as
to whether the business judgment rule is appropriate for
condominium and other real estate transactions.
"To receive [the business judgment rule] protection, a board
or association must not breach its fiduciary duties to the unit
owners."60 "The business-judgment rule is generally inapplicable to
boards of property owners associations . . . [because] [u]nlike a

business corporate board, whose function is usually acquisition, a
property owners association board is expected to protect and preserve
property values." 6' Therefore, certain conduct and decisions that may
be considered permissible among business persons may be
impermissible for officials of a property owner association.62
Although traditionally considered part of the fiduciary duty trifecta as
falling under the umbrella of the duty of loyalty, the "duty of good
faith" can be extended to situations beyond a fiduciary obligation
because most (if not all) courts will allow the implicated duty of good
faith and fair dealing to be considered in relation to a claimed breach
of contract.63 "Where the fairness of a fiduciary transaction is
challenged, the burden of proof is upon the fiduciary to prove by
clear and satisfactory evidence that such transaction was fair and
56

Zuckerman, supra note 2, at 930.
Id.
58 Id. (citing Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del.
1993)).
59
Id. at 934 (citing Mulligan v. Panther Valley Prop. Owners Ass'n, 766 A.2d
1186, 1190-91 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
6 Id. at 940 (citing Vincent Di Lorenzo, New York Condominium and
Cooperative Law § 12:3, at 217 (2d ed. 1995, supp. 2007-2008).
1Unrau v. Kidron Bethel Ret. Servs, Inc., 27 P.3d I (Kan. 2001).
62
Id. (citing ROBERT G. NATELSON, LAW OF PROPERTY OWNERS
AssOciATioNs, §10.3.1 (1989)).
6
1See id. at 14.
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done in good faith." 6"
In analyzing what should be done and when by an association
is done, a declarant-controlled board, due to its "insider"
sale
a
after
status, may be better positioned to get the declarant-developer to
voluntarily address remediation of construction defects (as opposed
to an elected/unit-owner-controlled board)."
Certain developers who are most interested in cost savings
may take the cheapest approach to identifying and solving any given
problem, which may ultimately mean that the cheapest solution in a
condominium repair scenario may turn out to be the shortest-lived
solution or the gateway to an even more expensive problem down the
road.6 6 "In addition, they may rely on judgment of the very design
professionals and subcontractors responsible for creating the defects
for guidance as to their severity, the appropriate method(s) of repair
and the cost."67 It may well be foolish for the association members to
rely on the developer or his contractor for a solution to building
issues, because depending on the developer's decisions that could
have been the foundation for the issues in the first place would
probably not put the board of managers in a good position to pursue
those responsible for their added costs.6 When a real estate
developer is just "doing his best" in terms of the project, trying to
balance his profit with responsible and workmanlike practices, his
judgment may not always come into play. When problems arise,
however, in the fiduciary duty context, an examination of what is
proper business judgment is often appropriate.
Issues arise when a unit-owner or association brings litigation
against a developer, and the corporate entity is defunct, fails to
defend, or refuses to produce information that could establish proper
or improper business decisions. While the burden may rest with the
fiduciary to prove certain decisions were fair and unimpeded by
personal interests, or at an "arm's length," costs in litigation mount
quickly. As such, while it is imperative to document carefully in preturnover matters, what may be more, important is to carefully
document before closing, and to require substantial completion if not
completion itself, before closing. Indeed, where the developer has the
buyer's funds, his motivation to finish the project significantly.
decreases. Consequently, one key idea in changing the system is
definitely to prevent and/or make illegal, pre-construction closings.
6

Id. at 16 (citing Newton v. Hornblower, Inc., 582 P.2d 1136 (1978)).
& Smith, supra note 33, at 94.

65 Sandgrund
66 Id.

67 Id.
68
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Where any developer is allowed to close units before his work is
done, after a closing, the burden shifts unfairly to the buyer, who is
almost always ill-equipped to solve problems. Eliminating the
legality of closings before final finish is but one method of solving
this problem, and although individual states have in many cases
attempted to impose a regulatory scheme to deal with these issues, a
more comprehensive system may be appropriate.
IV. CUSTOMARY ISSUES AFFECTING DEVELOPERS
A developer's life is never boring. From finding suitable real
estate, to determining the feasibility of a project, and in some
instances juggling acts to oversee multiple projects at once, real
estate developers in general, and condominium developers
specifically, face many interesting challenges. While many
successfully overcome twists and turns in the road, some are less able
to navigate those channels, which can . impart interesting and
sometimes very negative results. After a project is conceived, the
developer must outline the financial roadmap, determine what work
must be done to make the condominiums fit for habitation-and sale,
and get through the necessary construction or rehab work to realize
those goals. After sales of units, but before the developer hands over
all responsibility to the unit owners, he or she is basically in charge of
the entire enterprise, from managing construction "workto writing
checks for all necessary expenses.
During the period of developer control "pre-turnover," there
arc many reasons why a developer might want to retain control over a
development when other unit owners are there to do so. In some
cases, a developer may want to oversee the finances or to avoid
commencing unnecessary capital pro ects during the period of the
developer's maintenance "guaranty". Moreover, the developer can
avoid litigation during the sales process, prevent unit owners from
levying a special assessment to fund a litigation war-chest, maintain
access to the common areas and sales office, and prevent amendment
of the governing documents. 70 Many developers hold on to control by
giving the false impression that they are still working, or they stall
the turnover, so that they can continue to project the image that all
will be completed "soon." While this is usually dangerous to believe
sight unseen, it is not unusual for unit owners to hold off on taking
Gary A. Poliakoff, Transition of Control of the Community Association
From the Unit Owners'Perspective,16 PROB. & PROP. 49, 50 (2002).
69
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any kind of action against a developer where the image is created that
he is still there to take on and solve problems.
Unfortunately, when the developer has ultimate control over
an association from its inception, his own initial budget may be the
first cause of the impossibility in problem solving. Where the
developer has not funded the association with enough money to do
anything, it lacks the ability to survive absent a cash infusion, which
is very typically funded by incoming purchasers, who are not
prepared for it and who will suffer financially because of it. Like a
business must have some starting cash in the register to operate, so
too must an association bank account be funded in order to operate,
because an expense will definitely arise. This is a key concept in
developer budgeting, because where a prospective purchaser is given
accurate information about financial and physical health of a
condominium from the outset, responsible decisions can be made
before closing as to whether or not the buyer wants to fund project
completion or any necessary repairs that are, in theory, the
developer's responsibility.
A. Lowballing MaintenanceFees to AttractBuyers

One issue in development and marketing of a condominium is
determining what budgetary requirements are minimally necessary
for the day-to-day operation and administration of the property. An
"assessment" or "HOA Fee" is commonly imposed on a monthly or
quarterly basis, which provides funding to the association. This
assessment typically covers such necessities as: insurance, water,
trash removal, snow removal and utilities. While some properties
include cable or security, the main idea is that the assessment, and the
initial budget which outlines it, are created and utilized for the
purpose of day-to-day administration. Where the account balance is
inadequate for the monthly or quarterly costs to the association, the
developer has abrogated in his duty to set up a mini-corporation
which is capable of the business for which it was created: the
continuation of a viable property. This is similar to the concept in
corporate law of "inadequate capitalization" which in that context,
may lead to individual liability. Similarly if the developer does not
deposit anything into the association bank account when it is opened,
the association is in theory incapable of existing. An omission of this
sort should be a clear factor adopted by all jurisdictions in
determining a breach of the developer's fiduciary duty to the
association and owners.
Because it is so common, developers are often accused of
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"lowballing" association fees, undercharging owners and subsidizing
operations to keep assessments low, and at an artificially low level, in
order to attract sales. 7 ' In many (and indeed most) jurisdictions,
developers are required to disclose the annual budget to prospective
purchasers pre-sale. In that there is temptation on the part of the
developer to manipulate the budget to achie'e the low maintenance
fees, regardless of the danger and likely risk of fraud and
misrepresentation, developers underestimate the costs to unit owners
because they want to be competitive in the market. 72
In situations where the developer set the assessments too low,
his intent usually is that after a certain initial sales period, the initial
services previously provided by him as a way to keep costs low, will
become expenses of the association. This will substantially increase
the periodic common expense assessments which association
members must ultimately bear (i.e. the developer sets up a "bait and
switch" where he attracts buyers with a low price on the monthly
assessment and then forces that assessment to be raised after he turns
the association over to owners in order to cover the costs that were
always there - or repairs that were always needed - but hidden

through his failure to disclose them). 73 Although it is not a
requirement in all states, some condominium statutes require
developers to set aside funds reserved for the future maintenance,
repair, replacement and/or preservation of the project's common
elements. Not only is this a good practice, but spreading the cost of
large repairs over time can have the effect of lessening burdens upon
owners in relation to large assessments. This is because requiring a
reserve fund that is sufficiently capitalized to pay at least in part of
the necessary costs of maintenance will only be necessary where
there is truly work to be done. If the developer has completed all
necessary work to deliver a properly built or rehabbed project, then
barring unforeseen emergencies, there is little work to be done on a
"'new" project - thus obviating the need for financial endowment and
spreading the costs to the unit owners who were never told those
costs were coming.
In California, courts have required developers to not only
establish a reserve fund during the period of developer control, but to
account for the fund without offsets or credits for maintenance or
71Pardon,
72 id.

supra note 50, at 15.

7 See e.g., Greencort Condo. Ass'n v. Greencort Partners, No. 4045, 2005 WL
2562909 (Pa. Corn. P1. Oct. 4, 2005).
74
Pardon, supra note 50, at 13.
75
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construction expenditures. 76 Similarly, Illinois courts have ruled that
a developer has a fiduciary duty to fund reserves." In jurisdictions
where no property report is required, buyers purchase real estate on
blind faith. Uniformity in this context is crucial, insofar as it is
axiomatic that where an association is created but not funded, it will
nearly always require owner funding for repair work in situations
where the developer had a responsibility to convey the condominium
units free from such burdens. Conversely, where such predevelopment and pre-sale bank account funding requirements are not
only imposed but actually met, the likelihood and impact of largescale capital improvement projects can be more fully evaluated by the
developer and the owners, which in turn, protects the purchaser.
Overall, if a party selling real estate is required in all instances to
know the condition of the building or property as a whole and to
share that information, and the prospective owner is informed of
whether the newly-formed association has the funding to make the
repair before he purchases, the nature of issues arising out of the
transaction would be greatly impacted.
B. Pre-SaleRequirements andDisclosure to Buyers

As an up and coming measure to head off developers who
could later be accused of making material misrepresentations about
real estate, some jurisdictions have introduced inspection and
disclosure requirements even before a project may be offered for sale,
or a building is granted approval of final inspections or green lights
for sale. This is an excellent requirement and one that could prevent a
significant amount of problems with real estate transactions.
In South Dakota, for example, the legislature has codified a
requirement of a developer to have and obtain a final inspection and
an approved report from the state's Real Estate Commission even
before a condominium project or unit is put up for sale. 78 The state's
Commission must approve a project and a public report on a project
before the developer may take reservations or offers for sale. The
Commission is the only party that can waive the inspection, and no
developer is allowed to enter into a binding contract until a copy has
T. WILLIAMS, OHIO CONDOMINIUM LAW § 34.3 (2011) (citing
PJNR, Inc. v. Dep't of Real Estate, 230 Cal. App. 3d 1176 (Cal. App. 5th Dist.
1981)).
7 Id. (citing Bd. of Managers of Weathersfield Condo. Ass'n v. Schaumburg,
307 Ill. App. 3d 614 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1999)).
78 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-15A-17 (2011).
7 See id.
76 CHARLES
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been provided to a purchaser and a ten-day period has elapsed, to
allow for the purchaser's review.80 This kind of codification can go a
long way toward ensuring that fraud and misrepresentation claims are
avoided.
Similarly, South Dakota law contains an enforcement
provision that provides for misdemeanor liability in the event of a
failure to disclose pertinent information by the developer or his
agents.8 1 South Dakota has better measures 'in place to avoid
problems than many other states, even though it may have less than a
quarter of the population of other states. This kind of forward
thinking, as in California, should be adopted nationwide.
In Ohio, a developer is required to furnish a two-year
warranty covering the full cost of labor and materials for any repair
or replacement of roof and structural components, and mechanical,
electrical, plumbing, and common service elements covering the
condominium property occasioned by a defect in material or
workmanship. 8 Ohio developers are further required to provide oneyear warranties for defects in materials or workmanship,
commencing on the closing date. While a longer warranty period is
absolutely beneficial to the purchaser, where the warranty language is
or may be allowed to contain exclusions or exculpatory language,
such warranty requirements do very little to protect the consumer.
Consequently, standardization of warranty language and exculpation
clauses could work to prevent injustice by a contracting party who
inserted language to protect a buyer in one sentence, but tried to take
it away in another.
Like South Dakota, Ohio developers are also subject to
extensive pre-sale disclosure requirements. Specifically, Ohio
purchasers are provided information about: the developer, narrative
descriptions relating to the property as a whole, construction status,
financing terms offered by the developer, warranties offered for
common elements and units, two-year budget projections, reports on
condominium conversion (if applicable) including remaining useful
life of all integral condominium components (including, inter alia, an
estimate of repair and replacement costs projected out for five years,
existence of reserve funds, the existence of management contracts,
terms of encumbrances or liens of any kind, escrow details, and
statements of litigation, if any).8 4
" See id. §§ 43-15A-13, -19.
1 See id. § 43-15A-25.
82 16 OHIO JuR. 3d Condominiums, Etc. §
14.(2011).
83 id.

M Id. §17.
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Despite this requirement, Ohio courts have held that a
"condominium owners' association may not maintain an action
against a condominium developer for breach of fiduciary duty absent
an understanding by both parties that special trust and confidence
have been reposed in the developer" by the association members.8 5
This is a unique twist on the law because of the unfortunate
likelihood that no developer would agree to language in the contract
that created such a special confidence. As a result, by the inclusion of
this language in the jurisprudence, Ohio courts have possibly blocked
any meaningful advance of the law in fiduciary cases involving
developers.
In Michigan, a developer's pre-sale disclosure requirements
include such interesting components as the names, addresses and
prior experiences with condominium projects of each developer and
any management agency, real estate broker, residential builder,
residential maintenance, and alteration contractor. 6 Where ,a project
is a conversion in Michigan, developers are required to provide the
following:
(1) A statement if known, of the condition of the main
components of the building, including the roofs;
foundations; external and supporting walls; heating,
cooling, mechanical ventilating; electrical, and plumbing
systems; and structural components. If the condition of any
of the components ... is unknown, the developer shall fully
disclose that fact. (2) A list of any outstanding building
code violations or other municipal regulation violations and
the dates the premises were last inspected for compliance
with building and housing codes. (3) The year or years of
completion of construction of the building or building(s) in
the project. 87
These Michigan requirements impose not only an affirmative
obligation on the developer's part to inform himself of the various
issues in order to comply with these disclosure requirements, but they
also provide a fair amount of information that a prospective purchaser
can use to fairly and honestly evaluate the viability of the
condominium and its association. If this was a standard that was
required everywhere, the state of condominium law would have
Belvedere Condo. Unit Owners' Ass'n v. R.E. Roark Cos., 617 N.E. 2d
1075,861083 (Ohio 1993).
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 559.184a (West 2011).
85

87

id.

Condo Developers and FiduciaryDuties

2011]

225

progressed significantly. If applied nationally, then a court's
continued reliance on caveat emptor would be justified, and the
burdens shouldered would reflect a greater equality between the
parties. Where courts are now applying caveat emptor, but are not
recognizing the issues involved in intentional or negligent disclosure
issues, the disparity in the bargaining positions and the legal positions
of the parties after a dispute has arisen is too great, which results in
"manifest unjustness."
In the Washington case of Kelsey Lane Homeowners' Assoc.

v. Kelsey Lane Co., Inc., a developer was not required to include
construction defects in a pre-sale offering statement where it was
established that the declarant was unaware of construction defects by
virtue of his relationship with the general contractor, since neither
was the agent for the other.8 8 Although the developer could be held
liable for misrepresentations under the Washington Condominium
Act's public offering statement requirements, a declarant is not held
responsible under a "should have known" standard.89 Where actual
knowledge cannot be established it is not imputed to the developer
under traditional rules of agency.?O Also, in Kelsey Lane, because the
association was not "formed" until the construction was completed
and the defective portion was sealed within the overall project, the
court found that the declarant could not have known about the defects
to disclose them.9 '
As such, collection and analysis of key information such as a
developer's date of purchase of the property and the date of
recordation of a declaration of condominium, and additional
information about a developer's knowledge of the property (including
appraisal and inspection documents), coupled with whatever the
lender knows or should know about the property and the transaction
as a whole may be crucial for purposes of discovery, litigation and
establishing liability in the context of proving what a developer or his
agents "knew" and when they knew it. All of this information is
critical for ensuring the success of not only a lawsuit but also for
making decisions long before the closing table. In reality, a purchaser
or condominium owner or association is not nearly as concerned with
whether they sue the developer or his subcontractor, as they are with
the viability of the case and the likelihood of recovery. As long as a
responsible party can be identified out of the disclosure and
88 Kelsey Lane Homeowners Ass'n v. Kelsey Lane Co., 103 P.3d 1256, 1261
(Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
89

d

9 Id.
'Id.

at 1264.
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knowledge requirements, the end result will be that in cases where a
duty was abrogated, there would be a workable remedy under the
circumstances.
C. Pre-TurnoverFiduciaryDuties

Before the developer has tendered control over the building or
project to the unit owners, there are still fiduciary duties held by the
developer relating to the building and the finances. In some cases, the
Uniform Condominium Act ("Act") has conferred a fiduciary duty on
the developer, by using a statutory section imposing a fiduciary duty
upon the association's governing body that the developer appoints. 92
Although not adopted by all states, the Act does nonetheless
provide a model for jurisdictions to explore the provisions of their
governing documents in relation to condominiums. Surprisingly, the
Act does not provide a general fiduciary duty to purchasers. It does
provide, however, that such a duty runs from members .of the
governing body of an association to whomever the developer
appoints. The developer does not owe others a fiduciary duty in the
developer/unit-owner sense. Only in the case of a developerappointed board member vis-i-vis the unit-owner, does such a duty
arise. However, it is not clear whether this means that the developer
does not have a duty to his purchaser in relation to the condominium.
To analyze this from the real-world perspective, however,
what must be examined -within the traditional trajectory of a
condominium purchase and sale transaction, the ideas that we have
about the developer and the ideas that the purchaser has about the
developer in terms of who does what and who is- really in charge.
Although the developer may be wearing the "association director hat"
he is not typically thought of as a director of an association when
dealing with a unit-owner. To them, he's nothing more than the
developer. As such, whether through email, phone or attorney-drafted
correspondence, the emphasis is usually placed on the developer as
"developer" and not as the "association leader.," Consequently, the
Act's use of terms and its implications suggest that for jurisdictions
that follow the Act, little attention may be paid to the developer's acts
and omissions as a developer, rather than as an association officer or
Rick McConnell, "You Can't Always Get What You Want - But if You Try
Sometimes, You Might Find, You Get What You Need": The Search for Single
Family Homeowner Protections in Missouri, 69 UMKC L. REV. 409, 418 (2000)
(citing Randolph v. Atkinson, 965 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998)).
9
Id. at 419.
9 Id. at 420.
92
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director, and unfortunately, these may be very dangerous, and costly,
distinctions.
In some jurisdictions, like Pennsylvania for example, a
developer's fiduciary duty arises when an initial public offering
document or disclosure is filed with the municipality, rather than
when a declaration is filed." In Greencort Partners Condominium
Ass'n v. Greencort Partners,the court considered when a fiduciary
relationship arose, before or after the filing -of the condominium
declaration, or when a public offering statement had been filed.96 The
holding, in conflict with the statutory language of the Pennsylvania
Condominium Act,97 provided that a condominium was created at the
time a declaration was filed.9 8. Like other jurisdictions, the Uniform
Pennsylvania Condominium Act listed various pre-sale disclosures,
delineating between new builds and conversions. The issue was one
of timing however, in relation to the filing of pre-sale disclosures and
recordation of condominium instruments. For a court to put emphasis
on the date of recordation as opposed to the date of filing the
instruments, where regardless of the two dates the developer was
responsible to know the condition of his own real estate before
selling it, is manifestly unjust, and the wrong issues were (or may
have been) put before the court.
I I Regardless of the law, until the owners take control, the
developer is typically responsible for all aspects of the project's
operations through the appointed directors. oo The developer is
charged with overseeing all aspects of building management,
including maintenance, revenue collection and protection of the
common areas. 10 Issues come up frequently in this context because
while the developer is still selling units or trying to advertise them, he
is often simultaneously taking over the building as a part of the
association or the manager/director of it - meaning that he voluntarily
Greencort Partners Condo. Ass'n v. Greencort Partners, No. 4045, 2005 WL
2562909, at *3 (Pa. Com. Pl. Oct. 4, 2005).
96 id
968 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3101 (2011).
98 GreencortPartners, 2005 WL 2562909, at *7 (citing 68 PA. CONS. STAT. §
3201 (2011)).
9 Id. at *12 (citing 68 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3404 (requiring pre-sale disclosures
of known conditions, pertinent dates of major repair, useful life calculations, age
and present condition of all building components, replacement cost assessments
and listing of any outstanding and/or uncured code violations)).
100 Pardon, supra note 50, at 12-13 .(citing Wis. STAT. § 703.15(2)(c) (West
2011)).
.

o'0Id. at 13.
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takes on two different roles which are or may be in conflict with one
another.102 Of course, the developer's goal is to make money on his
business enterprise (which is why he is in business in the first place)
but he cannot proceed on the making money side of his venture if at
the same time he is depriving the buyer of the benefit of their bargain,
because to do so may well result in litigation brought by unsatisfied
purchasers. 0 3
Under section 6.20 of the Restatement (Third) of Property, the
developer's role will dictate the type and kind of duty he is subject to
vis-i-vis the condominium association members.'* As a mere
"seller" of real estate, the developer has no fiduciary obligation
because he is nothing more than a seller in an arm's length
transaction. 05 However, when a developer develops a condominium
project, much a like a corporate promoter, he has certain duties of
care in relation to beginning and running the project (with the
foundation of that duty coming from corporate principles).' 6 Similar
to corporate law, where a promoter of a business entity cannot take
any action that would prevent the entity from being operated as
intended, a developer in setting up a condominium association may
not prevent the association from being operational from its
inception. 1o7 Some courts have held that developers have breached
their duties when they have turned over to owners, control of a
project that is in a state of disrepair and with under funded
accounts. 0 8 The question then of whether there is a fiduciary duty
toward others, possibly should be resolved under the Restatement
view, by utilizing such factors as the role the developer is playing at
the time, the particular activity he is engaging in, or his statements, in
order to determine if any fiduciary obligations are coming into play.
It begs the question of whether the developer is to announce his
motivation for any given decision, and whether, even if required to, it
would be done.
Having somewhat examined this question, in Illinois
developers hold a fiduciary duty as directors of a not-for-profit or as
102 Id.

103

id.

' RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES
105 Pardon, supra note 50, at 13-14.

§ 602 (2007).

1o6 Id. at 14; see Duncan v. Brookview House, Inc., 205 S.E.2d 707 (S.C.
1974); Rafalowski v. Old Country Rd. Inc., 719 A.2d 84 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997).
107 Maercker Point Villas Condo. Ass'n v. Szymski, 655 N.E.2d 1192 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1995).
108 Concerned Dunes W. Residents, Inc. v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 562 S.E. 2d
633, 637 (S.C. 2002).
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th'e developer-controlled board of managers. 09 Since Illinois courts
have found that a real estate developer is a fiduciary vis-i-vis the
unit-owners, courts will allow a fiduciary finding absent an analysis
of the developer's role in the association. 'o This suggests that Illinois
courts see the big picture that as a developer, because a buyer
naturally reposes confidence in him to develop, and adequately so,
that there is an inherent fiduciary obligation flowing downstream
from the developer to the buyer, simply based upon the nature of the
transaction and its magnitude. Likewise, in Colorado, developers may
be subject to actions for negligent misrepresentation in circumstances
where people or property are harmed, or where there is a financial
loss in the course and conduct of commerce."' Statutorily, a
developer-builder is under a duty to disclose all known material facts
that "in equity and good conscience should be disclosed" when
marketing any kind of common interest community, including townhomes and condominiums.112 'Additionally, when deceptive trade
practices are involved, the developer-builder may be liable to
purchasers of its units under Colorado's Consumer Protection Act
("CCPA")."1

However, not all jurisdictions impose broad, unfettered duty
upon developers.1 14 In the case of Belvedere Condominium Ass'n v.
Roark, the Ohio Supreme Court held that developers were not
fiduciaries and recognized that the developer's right to protect its
own interest in promoting its project was tempered only by the
buyers' rights to employ consumer protection statutes in their favor
for alleged breaches. 5 The majority reasoned that the state
legislature provided inherent statutory consumer protections, such as
the association's ability to cancel developer contracts, and the
phasing out of developer control over time."
The dissenting opinion in Belvedere suggests that the
majority's decision denying a fiduciary duty claim against the
developer was akin to permitting the developer to engage in selfdealing with impunity, while operating the owners' association
109 Eunice A. Eichelberger, 8 ILL. REAL PROP. § 43:100 (citing Wolinsky v.
Kadison, 449 N.E.2d 151 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)).
"o See Glickman v. Teglia, 902 N.E.2d 1256, 1260 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
11 Sandgrund & Smith, supra note 33:

112 id.
" Id. (citing COLO. REv. STAT. § 6-1-101, et seq (West 2011)).
114Pardon, supra note 50, at 13 (citing Belvedere Condo. Unit Owners' Ass'n

v. R.E. Roark Cos., 617 N.E.2d 1075 (Ohio 1993)).
" Id. at 14.

116 d
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(therein disputing the Ohio legislature's intent in that regard)."'
Justice Douglas stated in his dissent "let all who will henceforth,
enter into a construction agreement with a developer-builder now be
aware that they should get, carved in stone, an 'understanding' that
they can have trust and confidence in their builder to be honest with
them."' 18
D. Social Media Implications

In our new age of social media, internet ratings and
commentary about business transactions, one need only Google,
access Yelp or check Angie's List (among other web information
sites in their locale) as to their particular developer. If a prospective
purchaser finds any commentary, it provides good ammunition and
reason to dig deeper in order to determine whether or not any given
transaction is wise. If nothing is discovered or if the reports are
positive, then certainly that should be more than enough to assuage
fears about moving forward.
Where a developer's reputation and his customers' thoughts
are freely strewn across the internet, does that then create any
obligation upon a purchaser to scour the publicly available
"commentary" to ascertain whether or not other people were happy
with their experience? If consumers these days are posting their every
thought and whim on Facebook and Twitter, then is there even any
need for a uniform law to protect them from a developer's failure to
disclose something important and/or material to the transaction?
While today's consumer or vendee should be aware that certain
information may be available publicly, there is no substitute for good
governance. Also necessary, is the enactment of laws that go not only
to consumer protection, but also to developer supervision, so that the
developer is following the law in the first instance, rather than the
latter end-solution of a consumer having a cause of action to file.
While it is a good idea to run some things through the internet search
engine before moving forward, the burden should not be on the
consumer to have to find out the negative information on his own,
when the developer is still in the best position to do the job right, sell
the property in an acceptable condition, and abide by both selfimposed and legally-imposed standards and duties. If a developer
were loathe to find negative commentary floating around cyberspace
about him, he could then take steps to avoid the need for such a post
" Id. (citing Belvedere, 617 N.E.2d at 242).

"' Belvedere, 617 N.E.2d at 291.
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to be placed in the first instance by selling only completed real estate
that has been duly inspected, insured and contracted for.
The failure of some courts to recognize the imbalance of
power between the developer and purchaser by sanctioning the
requirement of developer disclosure does not suggest the judiciary is
yet moving forward as a whole. In fact, just the opposite seems true
in some cases. For example, Utah does not recognize an independent
duty to comply with building codes, with Utah courts holding that
developers have no duty to act without negligence in the construction
of homes.' 19 Utah courts have found that because a condominium
association had no direct contractual relationship with the developer,
builder or other party, it lacked the requisite connection for any
independent duties to attach. 120 This suggests that in that particular
case, the court was turning a blind eye to the obvious position of the
condominium association, and taking a very strict and narrow view of
what duties apply to real estate developers. Such strict and narrow
viewpoints should be the exception and not the norm.
Where an association is empowered by the declarations to act
on behalf of unit owners, why should a court require privity to
establish a fiduciary relationship, when such a relationship is not
recognized in Utah and other jurisdictions between the developer and
purchaser of real estate? -To discriminate because the association
likely filed suit, rather than the members themselves, is to blindly
ignore the real legal and equitable issues. Who is the plaintiff is not
the issue, as long as the plaintiff should otherwise have standing and
can establish interest and a live controversy. Refusing to protect an
unsuspecting purchaser who trusted an obvious fiduciary, especially
in current economic times where housing values have tanked, puts
undue pressure and financial hardship onto a purchaser, who is often
pushed to the brink of financial ruin when involved with a real estate
transaction gone bad. The courts and legislatures can do better.
E. InsuranceImplications

Regardless of whether the developer stands as a fiduciary to
the owners, his appointed directors do have a common law fiduciary
duty to the association as directors of a corporation. 121 Condominium
119 Davencourt at Pilgrim's Landing Homeowners Ass'n v. Davencourt at
Pilgrim's Landing LC, 221 P.3d 234, 247-48 (Utah 2009) (holding that Utah
building codes do not create any independent legal duties for purposes of avoiding
the economic loss rule).
120 Id. at 245.
121Pardon,

supra note 50, at 14 (citing Rose v. Schantz, 201 N.W.2d 593 (Wis.
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association members who act as managers or board members also
have duties, and they can be breached if they do not abide by the
regulations or themselves enforce them for the benefit of the entire
association, which can include disclosure of misconduct by others,
including the developer. 122 The issue of developer misconduct begs
the question of whether liability insurance policies (also known as
"D&O" policies) would cover acts and omissions by the developer
who set up the policy, if they cover the developer as the controlling
"association member." It raises the issue of whether such policies are
intended to be applicable only to the unit-owner elected board
members rather than the developer in control of the association.
When principals of the developer entity place themselves into
association affairs (as is often the practice), they may be removing
themselves from any corporate entity shields held by the
development entity. 123 Consequently, where the developer acts on
behalf of the association and there is no "umbrella" of a corporate
shield to protect the developer from being held liable for his acts and
omissions vis-a-vis the unit owners who make up the association, the
question of whether or not the association insurance policies in place
for directors and officer's acts and omissions actually covers the
developer must be answered.
Typical condominium association D&O policies should be
considered forward-looking, and thus only applicable to unit-owner
members of the board and not to developer-appointed board
members. In the situation where the D&O policy covers the
developer as association member, the developer could force an
association into financing the developer's defense on the insurance
even though he may be the party at fault in the first instance.
Although it seems impossible to fathom that a bad developer could
force his victims to pay for his legal defense, where D&O policies do
not make this clear, a developer's tender of coverage to the condo
association master policy carrier could easily happen.
This idea does not appear to have been fleshed out in the case
law, at least in Illinois, but if true, it should then create the impetus in
the developer to self-insure for his acts and omissions (including
construction negligence), which are typically excluded from a
traditional commercial general liability policy held by the developer.
This suggests that insurance policy drafters should be clearer as to
exactly whom the said policy is designed to protect and insure. This
1972).
122 Id.
123 id.
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also means that it is wise for incoming buyers and their counsel to
request or verify evidence of a developer's insurance through a
commercial general liability policy, at a minimum, so that the issue
of coverage is not left looming. Where there could be a requirement
in place for ensuring proper insurance coverage and a developer
would not be allowed to close on unit sales without it, there would be
far fewer uninsured or underinsured developers (providing a
corresponding benefit for the unit owner, the insurance companies
and the title agents who are closing these transactions). Although
many lenders loaning money to a developer may include in their
lending instruments or closing instructions an affirmative obligation
to purchase, and in fact deliver appropriate insurance, many
situations arise where the lender did not confirm the existence or
appropriateness of the developer's insurance, which may go toward
lender liability.
One question that may come up is, how long could a
developer even be in control in the "typical" project? As is outlined
in Wisconsin and other states, condominium laws typically clarify the
developer's responsibilities during the period of their control (which
is usually one to three years from the filing of the declaration or a
certain time period after 75% of the units have been sold).124 A
developer, in some instances, can be charged with the failure to take
action at a time when it is prudent to do so.' 25 Hisfailure to act can
take many forms and often shows up in instances where the
developer retains control of the association for a period of time and is
unwilling or fails to make or enforce rules for fear of endangering the
sales program. This, when coupled with his obvious lack of desire to
engage in any dispute with unit owners, or his false sense of security
that is often associated with the somewhat inappropriate notion that
the developer does not have to do anything until his last unit is about
to be sold, in many situations creates liability in the developer as
against unit owners, which could have been prevented with better
foresight and disclosure.
The principles of fiduciary duties in general, and the
requirqment that one subject to those duties should avoid conflicts of
interest, do not automatically mandate that the developer should
avoid dealing with unit owners at all; however the officers and
directors of an association must clearly understand that their office is
a position of trust which is not to be abused for personal advantage or
124 Mark R. Hinkston, Wisconsin's Revised Condominium Ownership Act, 77
Wis. LAW. 10 (Sept. 2004).
125 Hyatt & Rhoads, supra note 12, at
937.
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to be exploited for any kind of personal gain or satisfaction. In fact, it
should be realized that the avoidance of the appearance of abuse (by a
developer) is or may be as important as avoiding the abuse itself.2 6
While this concept is so often ignored in condominium transactions,
the key problems can still be avoided with meticulous inspection and
pre-purchase due diligence. That, along with the hopeful changes to
the real estate purchase and sale rules and regulations, which are and
should be followed by all of those aforementioned "players" in the
real estate and condominium game, would go a long way toward
meaningful change. As stated above, more stringent rules for pre-sale
and post-sale condominium transactions would greatly impact the law
and the emerging issues faced by buyers and sellers alike.
. V. COMMON CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST DEVELOPERS
When any or all of the precautionary measures mentioned
above fail, condo owners may be forced to examine potential
common causes of action against developers. Associations and unitowners (and indeed counsel representing them), when faced with
building, unit or common area problems relating to a particular
property, must inform themselves about the available causes of action
that can be sustained against a recalcitrant developer and his agents.
Usually where counsel is retained, an evaluation must be made of
whether claims are individual or common, whether the association
entity should make claims on behalf of unit owners, and whether
contractual provisions prohibit recovery in any areas. Regardless of
what claims are ultimately levied, success or failure depends heavily
on the on the proofs that can be collected against a developer or his
agents, and it is incumbent upon parties and their counsel to be aware
of what their local and neighboring jurisdiction may allow. In many
instances, unit owners may have claims for breach of contract,
warranty or for breach of a fiduciary duty. In still other cases, claims
of fraud may be warranted, however all of these depend on the law of
the particular jurisdiction and the facts of the case that will or will
not, bring a matter within a particular cause of action.
A. Warranty Breaches, Deceptive Trade PracticesandFraud

Many states have what are generally known as consumer
protection acts or deceptive trade practices acts. 2 71In general, these
126

Id. at 945.

127 Kennedy

& de Haan, supra note 29 (citing Richard D. Connor & Cynthia

A. Hatfield, Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices in ConstructionLitigation and
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acts broadly provide that unfair business practices in the course and
conduct of trade and commerce may give rise to liability.'2 8 Under
such acts, a corporate officer or agent of a developer may be held
personally liable for damages caused by his fraud and deceit. 2 9 Also,
"[a]n equitable accounting is or may be proper where a fiduciary
relationship exists between the parties, where fraud or
misrepresentation is alleged, or where accounts are mutual or
complicated and plaintiff does not possess an adequate remedy at
law."130 It is important that transactions are carefully documented,
and that claims involving fraud or misrepresentation are backed by
the ability to prove them with clear and convincing evidence.
Sometimes the issue in a fraud case revolves around whether
the fraud claim is based upon what the developer said he did, or what
he said he would do in the future. Supporting claims against the
developer, various courts look to what kind of duties are owed to the
purchaser. In Indiana, for example, courts have found as a matter of
law that a developer owed a purchaser a duty of fair dealing and
honesty and a duty of good faith and fair dealing. 1 3 1 In holding that
where evidence established fraud and the developer's failure to meet
its contractual duties (eveh where statements were of a future regard
rather than as to present facts that typically support claims of fraud or
constructive fraud), because there was a fiduciary relationship
between real estate developer and the buyer, a constructive fraud
finding was appropriate.' 32 This means that Indiana courts not only
hold consumer protection in high regard, but established it as a firm
principle that is inherent in the purchase of real estate. Where
unqualified statements were made in order to induce buyers to
purchase real estate, such inducement and resulting damages can
amount to constructive fraud.133 . This suggests again that pre-sale
disclosures ought to be bolstered with municipal and title company
requirements and inspections that give the purchaser every assurance
Arbitration,49 S.C. L. REV. 977 (1989)).
128

Id.

Hyatt & Rhoads, supra note 12, at 972 (citing 3A W. FLETCHER, PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 1143, at 207 (perm. ed. rev. 1975)).
130 Greencort Partners Condo. Ass'n v. Greencort Partners, No. 4045, 2005
WL 2562909, at *7 (Pa. Com. Pl. Oct. 4, 2005) (citing Rock v. Pyle, 720 A.2d 137,
142 (Pa. Super. 1998)).
131 See Yeager v. McManara, 874 N.E.2d 629, 636 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)
(although the coirt did not require a fiduciary relationship to exist to base the
constructive fraud finding).
129

132

id.

'3 Id. at 642.
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that work is complete and satisfactory, before the transaction funds
and closes.
In most courts, fraud claims require very specific allegations,
the establishment of facts to meet required factors, and ultimate
proofs of intentional conduct. Although it is often hard to prove
intentional conduct in relation to business decisions, would-be
plaintiffs can outline contractual provisions that cover failure-tofollow municipal rules regarding licensure, permitting and codes in
support of fraud and contractual claims. Apart from what is, or may
be, embodied in the contract, implied terms and warranties are often
applicable to protect purchasers.
1.Implied Warranties
"In the sale of new homes, the vast majority of states
recognize an implied warranty of habitability between the buyer and
seller" in real estate transactions.134 Multiple types of warranties
exist, including the implied warranty of habitability, the implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose and the implied warranty
of good and workmanlike construction.'" Some jurisdictions allow
an implied warranty that a home will comply with the applicable
building code. 3 6 In construction contracts, it is usually implied,
unless there is an express contract or agreement to the contrary, that a
builder will erect the building in a reasonably good and workmanlike
manner, and it will be reasonably fit for its intended purpose. 37
But what if the prospective homeowner does not hire the
builder to build the house, but instead buys one from him already
built? Given the increasing complexity of construction techniques
and limitations on access to the property during various building
stages may prevent inspection, courts have recognized that buyers
have to rely on the skills of the builder.13 8 The Iowa Supreme Court,
relying on the Missouri Supreme Court decision of Smith v. Old
Warson Development Co. (sitting en banc) noted the following:
Kennedy & de Haan, supra note 29, at 4 (quoting Caryn M. Chittenden,
From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Equity - The Implied Warranty of Quality
Under the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act, 27 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
571, 572 (1992); Hyatt & Rhoads, supra note 12, at 955-58).
13s Id. at 4 (citing Luker v. Arnold, 843 S.W.2d 108, 115 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992);
Gorsky v. Triou's Custom Homes, Inc. 755 N.Y.S.2d 197, 201 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2002); Chittenden, supra note 134, at 572).
136 Sandgrund & Smith, supranote 33, at 92.
1 Busker v. Sokolowski, 203 N.W.2d 301, 303 (Iowa 1972).
138See, e.g., Kirk v. Ridgeway, 373 N.W.2d 491, 494 (Iowa
1985).
134
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Although considered to be a real estate transaction because
the ownership of land is transferred, the purchase of a
residence is in most cases, the purchase of a manufactured
product: the house. The land involved is seldom the prime
element in such a purchase ... certainly not in urban areas

... The structural quality of a house, by its very nature, is
nearly impossible to determine by inspection after the
house is built, since many of the most important elements
of its construction are hidden from view. The ordinary
"consumer" can determine little about the soundness of the
construction, and must rely on the fact that the buildervendor holds the structure out to the public as fit for use as
a residence, and being of reasonable quality. Certainly.. .
no determination of the existence of a defect [the settling of
the house] could have been made without ripping out the
slab that settled, and maybe not even then. The defect was
latent and not capable of discovery by even a careful
inspection .. . common sense tells us that a purchaser under
those circumstances should have at least as much protection
as a purchaser of a new car, or a gas stove, or a sump pump
39

or a ladder.1

Thus, if meaningful change can be made to our "system" of
overseeing real estate transactions, it is imperative that there is
imposed the requirement that the developer hire an independent
engineer to evaluate the property and for the developer to make
known publicly, the findings of said engineer. Only then can it be
fairly said that what the true professionals did not find or know about,
the developer could not disclose. In that scenario, where the buyer
did not go into the wall or under the house, he might be fairly
required to take his chances when he buys a home already built, and
there also existed the option for him to build one himself. Apart from
the cost differences that make the higher priced inspection options
less of a choice for most people, the real issue is that for there to be a
uniform system involving the developer, so too must there be one
relative to the buyer. If we are to think that a home purchase in
Wyoming is just as special as in Virginia, then so too must there be
uniformity in the approaches to the risks of home purchasing, one
that fairly balances the rights of the vendor as against the vendee.
Buyers in all states need to inspect, and proceed from start to finish
with experienced real estate counsel. Since in many jurisdictions the
39

Id. (citing Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795, 799 (Mo. 1972)
(en banc)).
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use of attorneys to assist with supposedly "simple" real estate
transactions is regarded as wasteful or unnecessary, if there were
greater recognition and acceptance from the public that navigation
assistance through these legal waters was important, there could be
meaningful change accomplished.
The Uniform Land Transactions Act ("ULTA") reflects the
current trend toward refusing to apply the traditional doctrine of
caveat emptor where injustice will occur, by providing in part that an
implied warranty will cover all purchases from "sellers in the
business of selling real estate." 140 The ULTA "applies to all real
estate, not just houses, and warrants that the building will be 'suitable
for the ordinary uses of real estate of its type' and is (1) free from
defective material and (2) constructed in accordance with applicable
law, according to sound engineering and construction standards, and
in a workmanlike manner."
As an added measure, "an implied warranty also takes into
account the equitable consideration that, between two innocent
parties, the one in the better position to prevent the harm ought to
bear the loss.",142 While a builder-vendor certainly has the opportunity
to notice, avoid, or correct latent defects during the construction
process, a similar opportunity exists for the developer-vendor. As one
court reasoned,

Purchasers from a developer-vendor depend on his ability
to hire a contractor capable of building a home of sound
structure. Where the buyer has no control over the sellerdeveloper's choice of contractor, the developer-seller
stands in the best position to know whether the contractor
he has hired can complete the work adequately. By
protecting the innocent home purchaser by holding the
developer-seller liable the law is coming to recognize that
the purchaser of a home does not stand on equal footing
with the builder-vendor or developer-vendor.14 3
The essence of the transaction is an implicit promise on the
140

Id. at 495.

141Id. (citing UNIFORIvI LAND TRANsAcTIoN ACT

§ 2-309, 13 U.L.A. at 609-10

(1980)).
142 Davencourt at Pilgrim's Landing Homeowner's Ass'n v. Davencourt at
Pilgrim's Landing, LC, 221 P.3d 234, 251 (Utah 2009) (citing Chandler v. Madsen,
642 P.2d 1028 (Mont. 1982)).
143 Id. at 251 (citing Tassan v. United Dev. Co., 410 N.E.2d 902, 908 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1980)).
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part of the seller to transfer a house suitable for habitation.144 If the
purchaser expected anything less, there would be no sale. 145 An
express written warranty may not provide sufficient protection
concerning latent defects, as suggested above, inasmuch as a buyer
who has no knowledge, notice, or warning of defects is in no position
to exact specific warranties from a developer, and any written
warranty demanded in any case would necessarily be too general to
enforce. 46 Only where a buyer knbws of all of the problems with a
particular parcel of real estate can he protect himself from the
developer who promises to fix them. Issues can arise as well, when a
developer does not undertake all repairs that are listed in common
warranty provisions provided by their counsel, so that the unit owner
may invariably feel a false sense of security when in fact, items not
improved by the developer form the foundation of warranty claims.
Purchasers and counsel must carefully align inspection lists
with implied warranty exclusions, so that defective or. unfinished
items are included in the developer's obligatory fixes. Where there is
a requirement upon the developer to disclose (within an engineerprepared property report all of the good and the bad), then similarly,
where a.condominium buyer informs himself about the true condition
of the property through a proper inspection, then problems are
minimized, thus lessening the negative effects of condominium
ownership.
2. Express Warranties
Apart from implied warranties, "in those instances where
express warranties have been made, either orally or in writing, the
are generally enforceable under basic theories of contract law."
Oral warranties, of course, may be rendered unenforceable through
the statute of frauds; however, the "part performance" exception may
be implicated where work relates to common elements of a
condominium project." 4 8
In examining cases involving fiduciary duties and warranty
claims, the Virginia case of Luria v. Board of Directors of Westbriar
Condominium Unit Ovners'Ass'n, was instructive. In that case, there
(citing Yepsen v. Burgess, 525 P.2d 1019, 1022 (Or. 1974)).
Id. (citing Sloat v. Matheny, 625 P.2d 1031, 1033 (Colo. 1981)).
Bethlamy v. Bechtel, 415 P.2d 698, 707 (Idaho 1966).
147 Hyatt & Rhoads, supra note 12, at 955
(citing 3 SAMUEL WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 526 (3d ed. 1963)).
148 Id. (citing Leo Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty
- Recent
Assaults on the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REv. 541, 548 (1961)).
14Id.

145
146
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was no fiduciary duty vis-i-vis the developer (through his entities)
and the condominium association because the association was not a
"creditor" of the developer. 149 The Virginia Supreme Court, relying
on tort law and the law of fraudulent conveyances, determined that a
creditor who was duly noticed of a potential warranty claim under the
statutory warranty scheme of the Virginia Condominium Act could
be held liable for a breach of a fiduciary duty for self-dealing.15 0
Although the Virginia court determined that the developer in
Luria was not put on actual notice of defects that could withstand a
claim for statutory warranty relief under the Virginia Condominium
Act, the court refused to find that the developer was a creditor who
owed the unit owners a fiduciary duty for their self-dealing.' 5 The
opinion does not mention any other possibilities of imposing a
fiduciary duty in Virginia against a recalcitrant developer, suggesting
that as of 2009, there is no applicable authority on the issue. As such,
what is clear at a minimum, is that express warranties must be drafted
and also edited in the negotiation phase of the transaction - to reflect
actual property conditions and to hold the developer to the standard
that the purchaser and indeed, the law, typically expects.
3. Liability Based On Fraud
Regarding expectations, it is fair to say that no one would
purchase a condominium if they thought that the developer was
engaging in outright fraud. As in other causes of action against -a
developer, a developer-builder or a developer-seller can also be held
liable under a theory of fraudulent misrepresentation if the
characteristics or quality of a home or unit are expressly
misrepresented.152 In many instances, a developer's fraud does not
consist of express misrepresentations; rather it is made up of the
developer's silence when the facts demand disclosure of his
knowledge to the purchaser.' 5 3 This can happen (and often does)
when the developer or his agents (including the realtor who shows
the property to prospective purchasers) have knowledge of important

149 Luria v. Bd. of Dirs. of Westbriar Condo. Unit Owners Ass'n, 672 S.E.2d
837, 841 (Va. 2009).
150

1

152

Id. at 840.
Id.

Kennedy & de Haan, supra note 29, at 7 (citing Lynn Y. McKernan, Strict

Liability Against Homebuildersfor Material Latent Defects: It's Time Arizona, 38
AluZ.

L. REv. 373, 378 (1996); Hyatt & Rhoads, supra note 12, at 970).
Id. at 8.

153
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issues affecting the property and they decide not to disclose them.154
Some states impose an authoritative rule on would-be
developers and take a "no prisoners" attitude toward shoddy
construction. For example, California courts have held that fraudulent
concealment occurs when a developer conceals from a purchaser a
material fact of the subject matter on which the transaction is based,
which the developer had a duty to disclose, thus imposing an
affirmative duty upon the developer to disclose to buyers information
that would affect, or might affect, the value of the homes which they
sought to purchase.'"s The courts' rationale was that a developer's
duty hinged on the disclosure of what was, what could be, or what
might be, in terms of value, safety, structural integrity, and promises
made.156

In Ohio, developers have been held strictly liable for
fraudulent failure to make (whether directly or indirectly) statutorily
required disclosures of all material circumstances or features
affecting the development in a readable and understandable written
statement, which may not omit or exclude any material facts or
otherwise contain any untrue statements of material fact.1 57 Ohio
remedies are available to actual and prospective purchasers, and the
plaintiff in such actions is not required to show damages caused by
any violation of a developer's disclosure provisions before recovering
damages (calculated by a statutory formula).158 Moreover, the Ohio
legislature forbids a developer's waiver or exculpatory language in a
condominium declaration (i.e. "opt out"), even where such a
provision is or was adopted and/or ratified by an owner's association
(insofar as such a release of liability is contrary to and in conflict
with the statute and thus invalid).15 9 This should be more
commonplace and, like in California, the concept of holding a
developer liable for failing (in essence) to do his "job" is one that is
being embraced with more frequency in the judiciary.
B. Negligence

In some jurisdictions, purchasers or associations may have
154 id.
15 Id. (citing Barnhouse v. City of Pinole, 183 Cal. Rptr. 881, 884, 890 (Cal.
App. 1st Dist. 1982)).
1ss id.
I5 16 OHIO JUR. 3d Condominiums, Etc. § 16 (2011).

8

59

1

1990).

id. § 19.
Id.; see also, Springer v. Koehler Bros., 591 N.E.2d 316 (Ohio Ct. App.
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viable actions for negligence against the developer pertaining to the
design or construction of real estate or to common areas within
association boundaries.160 To maintain a successful negligence claim
in most courts, aggrieved parties have to show that there was an
unsafe condition, negligently created by the developer or his agents.
This is because someone who is a real estate developer is
traditionally expected to exercise a certain degree of skill and
expertise that is typically thought of as being common amongst those
in the particular locale, who do what he does - develop land for a
particular use.161 The fiduciary dity between a developer and an
association or its members constitutes a type of special relationship
that gives rise to an independent duty in tort.162 Many courts have
recognized that fiduciary relationships, such as attorney-client,
doctor-patient, and insurer-insured, automatically trigger independent
duties of care.' 6 3 However, cases of negligence and non-compliance
with a building code do not arise from a fiduciary duty and thus, may
be precluded by the economic loss rule.164 This means that counsel
evaluating a buyer's remedies against a developer must be aware that
tort rules may push any given case in court toward either an avenue
of fraud or breach of fiduciary duty on one hand, or to a breach of
contract or warranty on the other.
Some states have allowed causes of action sounding in
negligence where there was alleged a duty on the part of the
.developer, who was not the builder, to ensure that work on a
condominium was completed in a workmanlike manner (as if he were
the builder himself).' 6 5 Courts have held that the developer was under
an obligation to oversee the details of the construction and to ensure
the condominium complex was built in a non-negligent manner and
with quality materials. 6 This gives rise to a duty to supervise work
or a cause of action for negligent supervision.
Kennedy & de Haan, supra note 25, at 9 (citing Lynn Y. McKernan, Strict

'

Liability Against Homebuildersfor Material Latent Defects: Its Time Arizona, 38
ARiZ. L. REV. 373, 375, fh. 24 (1996)).
161Id. (citing McKernan, supra note 160, at 375, fn. 24); see also, Hyatt &

Rhoads, supra note 12, at 962.
162 Davencourt at Pilgrim's Landing Homeowners Ass'n v. Davencourt at
Pilgrim's Landing LC, 221 P.3d 234, 247-48 (Utah 2009) (citing Grynberg v. Agri
Tech, Inc., 10 P.3d 1267, 1271 (Colo. 2000)).
163

16

Id. at 247.

4 Id.

Kennedy & de Haan, supra note 29, at 10; see also, Point E. Condo.
Owners Ass'n v. Cedar House Ass'n, 663 N.E.2d 343, 356-57 (Ohio Ct. App.
1995).
166 Kennedy & de Haan, supra note 29, at 10.
165
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General contractors have also been held to a duty to ensure
that the sprinkler sub-contractor had constructed the sprinkler system
in a good and workmanlike manner with quality materials, and the
fact that a subcontract existed between the _general contractor and the
subcontractor was irrelevant to the court. 16,This creates the potential
for a complication in the generally accepted definition of
"independent contractor" vis-i-vis "employee," whereby traditional
notions of independent work can come into conflict with generally
accepted legal principles relating to worker's compensation,
mechanic's lien issues, and contractual liability. Specifically, if a
particular subcontractor is regarded as an employee of the general
contractor, then there is a line drawn in terms of whether or not that
subcontractor could be held liable for bad work, and vice versa. As
such, while not only should the developer and purchaser carefully
draft their agreements with these issues in mind, so too should
subcontractors and general contractors document their arrangements
and scope of *work and supervision, so as to avoid these
complications.
In some instances, the developer does not act as the actual
builder, and he instead acts as owner who. contracts with a general
contractor or construction manager.'68 This does not mean that the
unit owners or association would have no recourse against the
developer in this scenario. Rather, courts have increasingly
recognized that the developer merely impliedly warrants that it will
develop in a good and workmanlike manner, and such warranties are
actionable (regardless of whether he is the one to hire the
subcontractors doing the work or not).169 Where a developer claims
that liability for faulty work or building issues should not attach
because he was not the builder, courts have* found that the
developer's implied warranties require development and construction
in a good and workmanlike manner with quality materials.o7 0
A Texas Court in the case of Luker v. Arnold aptly explained
that:
[T]he developer is in a better position to prevent loss ...
Further, most purchasers do not have responsibility or
experience to determine lot size . . . or deed restrictions ...

They must rely on the developer's expertise in this area.
161

168
169

PointE. Condo, 663 N.E.2d at 353.
Kennedy & de Haan, supra note 29, at 10.
id

1o Id.

1992)).

at 11 (citing Luker v. Arnold, 843 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. Ct. App.
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Finally the developer is more able to absorb the cost of
damages associated with inferior development than the
individual consumer.17 1
This acknowledgement of the relative ease within which the
developer should shoulder such burdens and the difficulty for the
buyer to do so, is exactly why warranties should be closely examined.
If a warranty exculpates a developer from having to abide by these
general responsibilities and shifts the burden unfairly, then it is
indeed necessary that such language be modified.
Indeed, where the developer has obtained substantial loan or
sales proceeds, he should be deemed to be in the better position to
avoid property and building related issues vis-i-vis the buyers.
Further, where municipal or statutory provisions do not afford
consumer protections, it is incumbent upon the purchaser to fully
inspect and fully document the transaction to cover all bases,
including paying full attention to the warranty provisions and
exclusions vis-i-vis the known property condition and inspection
reports.
C. Lender Liability
Apart from a focus on the developer, what about the entity
that funds his work? What happens in situations when the developer
is potentially liable to a homeowners' association or to an individual
unit owner, but the developer is insolvent?l 7 2 If the developer is
insolvent, potential plaintiffs should be able to sue the developer's
lender because lenders in many instances have the right to oversee
and fund the work being done before sales take place, thus placing
themselves square in the cross-hairs when work is done poorly (since
often it is the case that a payout is not approved absent inspection and
architect approval). Where the plaintiff can establish that the lender
participated in the construction, or possessed certain specific rights of
control over the project, courts have found that the lender could be
liable for the plaintiff s damages.
A distant California decision, Connor v. Great Western
Savings & Loan Ass'n illustrates that a lender may be subject to
liability if it actively participates in the development of real estate.173
Where the lender has the right to control disbursement of funds and
171Id. (citing Luker,
72

1

173

Id. at 32.

843 S.W.2d at 117).

Id. at 33 (citing Connor v. Great W. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 447 P.2d 609

(Cal. 1968)).
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the right of refusal when work is non-conforming to codes or plans
and specifications, then it may be found that the lender has gone far
beyond its traditional role as mere financier, and instead could be
found to be a joint venturer or partner with regard to the
development.174 The Connor Court was unique in its approach to the
lender, and that viewpoint is one that should be expanded nationally
and could easily be expanded, because nearly all mortgage and
security instruments and promissory notes provide lenders with rights
of control, supervision and access to the property to protect their
collateral. In theory, lenders undertake a significant amount of due
diligence when evaluating a loan for real estate, and where a project
is funded and a developer is given large amounts of money but fails
to complete the project or to use the money wisely, if the financial
institution had the right and ability to oversee it, that lender should
potentially be liable to the unsuspecting consumers who purchase that
real estate for the simple reason that the lender is in an excellent
position to impose rules that require the developer-to follow both the
law, and commercially reasonable construction standards that the
lender can not only double-check, but can refuse to fund if
inappropriate.
Similarly, when a lender forecloses on real estate that is
incomplete and comes in to replace the developer and finishes a
project or a unit, the lender may be held responsible under the
developer or builder's standards and duties. Where a lender becomes
involved in a project other than as a mere lender, the lender becomes
liable for its own acts, omissions under the Connor standard, and any
obvious and discoverable construction defects caused by the original
developer or builder.' 75 In Chotka v. Fidelco Growth, a lender
foreclosed on property that had been substantially completed by the
developer, excepting recreational areas and lobbies.' 7 In Chotka, the
lender also undertook to complete some individual units, and later
certain unit owners sued for acts and omissions related to the
construction. 177 The lender denied knowledge of the defects at the
time of foreclosute and denied that it was liable as a developer of the
project.178 Looking beyond the characterization of the lender as a
mere financer, the court reasoned that the defendant became more
than a lender when it took title to the project by virtue of the
Id. at 33-34; Connor,447 P.2d at 616.
us Kennedy & de Haan, supra note 29, at 35; see also, Chotka v. Fidelco
14

Growth, 383 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
176 Kennedy & de Haan, supra note 29, at 35.
7 Id.
"78 id.
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foreclosure and finished the outstanding work left to be done by the

original developer. 179
As in Chotka, where a lender takes title to a project,
completes construction, holds itself out as developer and owner, and
markets and sells units, it steps into the shoes of the developer and is
liable in the same manner as the original developer.so Therefore,
buyers must be wary of projects with lender involvement. Due
diligence, including public record and title searches that include
collateral assignments and documents ev'idencing a lender's
ownership and/or right to manage the property can often times signal
that the developer had problems, which may not be too far from the
surface. Where a developer could not adequately fund construction to
completion such that a lender was forced to take over, one should be
extra weary of the state of the union in real time, and not just on
paper.
VI. VACANT REAL ESTATE
Sometimes the issue in a real estate dispute is one over the
purchase and/or development of vacant land, which is very common
in condominium purchases and sales. The Interstate Land Sales Full
Disclosure Act applies to property for sale or lease, including
condominium properties, conveyed through interstate commerce that
is divided and/or is proposed to be divided for the purpose of sale or
lease as part of a common promotional plan.' Omitting many
variables that are required in traditional causes of action, a claim
under this act does not require a wronged plaintiff to prove reliance,
or the defendant's fraudulent intent. Instead, the claimant must
establish material omission or misrepresentation (even innocent or
unintentional) by the developer. This statute, however, applies only to
unimproved lots, and it is not intended to apply to a parcel of land
that is already developed or improved.182 The statute usually applies
to claims made by purchasers claiming they were induced to buy land
as a result of false promises and misrepresentations.' Since this
M7id.

18o Id. at 36; see also, McKnight v. Bd. of Dirs., 512 N.E.2d 316, 319 (Ohio
1987).
181Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. 1701 (1968).
182 Id. §1403(a)(2).
183Kennedy & de Haan, supra note 29, at 21-22. (citing Beauford v. Helmsley,
740 F. Supp. 201, 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Hester v. Hidden Valley Lakes, Inc., 495
F. Supp. 48, 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Bryan v. Amrep Corp., 429 F. Supp. 313, 320
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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scenario is often experienced by out of state claimants and those who
invest a substantial sum in furtherance of lofty property goals,
utilization of the Act is a definite go-to tool in any legal arsenal,
when eyeing possible causes of action against developer wrongdoing.

VII. AFFIRMATIVE

DEFENSES COMMONLY ASSERTED BY
DEVELOPERS

No trip into the land of developer lawsuits would be complete
without at least a cursory mention of the defenses that could be
asserted by a developer. It is important to note that although it may be
obvious, even where a developer has breached his duty to a
purchaser, where an appropriate and applicable defense is asserted,
the developer may escape full liability to a plaintiff-purchaser.
Surprisingly, some courts often allow affirmative defenses held by
the developer when posed with questions about developer liability for
acts and omissions during their control over real estate. In Raintree
Homeowners' Ass'n. v. The Dreyfus Interstate Development Corp.,
the Minnesota appellate court granted summary judgment in favor of
the developer, relying on three affirmative defenses: lack of notice,
statute of limitations and laches.184
In that case, the developer Dreyfus undertook to build 336
condominiums. 85 The declarations provided that the developer
would remit payment to the association for all undeveloped units. 8 6
The association was responsible to annually calculate each owner's
assessment and send written notice of the amount due. 8 8 In addition,
unpaid assessments were to be automatically treated as liens upon the
property.' 8 8 After building only 172 units, the developer sent notice
to the association. 8 9 Nineteen years later, after the lapse of all notices
regarding the assessments for subsequent years, the association
brought suit against the developer for the unpaid yearly assessments,
alleging breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, and seeking
declaratory relief and damages for the unpaid assessments, interest
and legal fees.190
18 Raintree Homeowners' Ass'n v. Dreyfus Interstate Dev. Corp., No. C3-002202, 2001 WL 712019 (Minn. Ct. App. June 26,2001).

185Id.

Id. at 1.
87 Id.
18s id.
18 id.
19oId.
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The Court concluded that the developer's failure to be
notified for nineteen years after the initial notice was an acceptable
affirmative defense.1"

As its foundation for denying relief in the

years where no notice was mailed, the Court cited to the declaration
that required annual notice of all assessments. 192 Finding that the
developer was essentially denied due process and an opportunity to
be heard, notice was deemed to be a prerequisite to an assessment
where provisions in the declaration required it.19 3 Additionally, the
Minnesota court relied upon the state's condominium act, which
provided a three-year period in which to collect assessments. 194 The
court further relied on laches for the proposition that an unreasonable
delay and prejudice would befall the developer, because the
association could have reasonably prevented the accumulation of
damages.' 9 5 Concluding that those three defenses were sufficient to
bar all claims, the court declined to further analyze additional
defenses, and -it upheld the trial court's grant of summary

judgment.1 96

The availability of these defenses provides an association an
impetus to (1) communicate clearly on the issue of outstanding fees,
assessments, and financial matters, (2) conduct an annual accounting
of condominium fiscal operations, and (3) timely collect whatever
sums might be deemed unpaid by the board of managers.
Additionally, where it can be established that the association or an
individual purchaser had a concurrent obligation to avoid the harm or
was in a position to do so, the developer's liability may be abrogated.
Any time a claim is thought viable as against a developer or
perceived "responsible party," these and other potential defenses
should be evaluated.
VIII. RESTATEMENT VIEW
As compared to many jurisdictions and mentioned supra, the
Restatement view on the topic of developers and fiduciary duties is
more restrictive. "Specifically, under the Restatement (Third) of
Property, the developer should not be held to the higher standard of a
7
trustee, but rather should be viewed more as a corporate promoter." 9
' Id. at 1-2.

192 id.
'9' Id. at 2.
' 9 4 Id. (citing MINN. STAT.
' Id. at 2.

19
19

id.

§ 515A.3-115(d)(2000)).

See generally, McConnell, supra note 92, at 418.
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Under this view, treating the developer and its appointee to the board
as trustees overstates the fiduciary component of the relationship. 98
The developer cannot be expected to act solely in the interests of the
association and the homeowners.' 99 Conflicts of interest are inherent
in the developer's role while it retains control over the association.2 0 0
The Restatement goes into a lengthy listing of the duties that exist, a
number of which are specifically related to maintaining common area
property.2 0 '
What may be questionable about the Restatement view, is that
it accepts the conflict of interest, yet makes no mention of any
disclosure requirements that developer should be required to make
regarding the conflict. For example, obligations to tend to common
areas may conflict with the developer's own bottom line. It is not
clear in many developer-condo cases where the line is or should be
drawn when it comes to this type of typical conflict.- The Restatement
offers little in the way of bridging this gap.
The Restatement also provides that one of the developer's
is
duties to enforce the condominium governing documents (i.e. the
declaration and by-laws, if adopted), including design controls. 202
While the duty only appears to extend until turnover to the owners'
association, different opinions exist as to what extent the developer's
participation in the management of the association (or lack thereof),
can be cured post-turnover. 203
Fiduciary duties, such as above, should have application or
extension past the turnover mark. One option is to outline the
developer's duty contractually, by inserting language in the contract
or addenda outlining repair, maintenance or financial obligations.
However, because this can be less uniformly applied if left to the
purchaser's counsel, state condominium or community association
laws should outline timelines and obligations for developers. These
obligations could include: minimum disclosure requirements;
completion of necessary capital improvements before conveyance;
the creation and enforcement of permitting and inspection guidelines;
and the requirement of financial participation in the association by
the, developer both during and after turnover, especially where
McConnell, supra note 92, at 419.
199 Id.. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES
198

§

6.20 cmt. a

(Tentative Draft No. 7, 1988)).
200 Id. at 419.
20'
202

Id. at 420.
Id. at 418 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6.20 cmt.

a (Tentative Draft No. 7, 1998)).
203

id
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developer-owned units are still unsold.
The Restatement does accept at least a limited fiduciary duty
- whereby because of the developer's control of an association, he
should be bound to exercise and provide limited protectioh of the
association and its members. 204 This is certainly an area where the
Restatement could use expansion and clarification in light of
dangerously common trends. If a developer is not required to manage
and have oversight of interests not his own, then likely is the scenario
that mismanagement becomes the rule, rather than the exception.
Only where there is a requirement of such oversight and management
is the developer more likely to participate, engage and honor his
obligations to finish what was started by his own "declaration."
Despite this gap in the law, the developers are not solely to
blame. Municipal authorities, nationwide, have failed to recognize
that purchasers are not in any position to navigate municipal and
legal waters when it comes to purchasing real estate, especially
condominiums. The state of the law of condominiums and developer
obligations is ripe for change.

IX. THE UNIFORM COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITY ACT
"Originally enacted in 1982, the Uniform Law Commission
("ULC") initially promulgated the original version of the Uniform
Common Interest Ownership Act (the "UCIOA"), which was created
as a uniform system encompassing several older ULC acts, including
the Uniform Condominium Act, the Uniform Planned Community
Act and the Model Real Estate Cooperative Act." 2 05 "The UCIOA is
a comprehensive act that governs the formation, management and
termination of common interest communities, whether or not the
community is a condominium, planned community or real estate
cooperative." 2 06 The ULC promulgated various amendments in both
2004 and in 2008, addressing various issues. Those changes included:
declarant responsibility for large and non-residential projects, easing
the process for "opting in" to the act, issues surrounding association
empowerment to deal with rented units, clarifying standards of care
applicable to association directors, as well as rules to deal with
association enforcement of building and aesthetic standards, the
Davencourt at Pilgrim's Landing Homeowners Ass'n v. Davencourt at
Pilgrim's Landing, LC, 221 P.2d 234, 246 (Utah 2009).
204

205 Uniform Law Commission, Common Interest Ownership Act Summary,
NCCUSL.ORG, http://uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Common%201nterest

%200wnership%2OAct (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
206

id.
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treatment of association by-laws, rulemaking, operation and
governance, increased flexibility in amending association
instruments, and flexibility in enforcement of unit-owner obligations.
Amendments also covered an association's record keeping
requirements, and expanded liability for a declarant's false statements
within public offering statements or financial disclosures, among
other things.207
"Along with the 2008 amendments, a new "bill of rights" was
drafted that draws together a number of provisions to provide
significant rights to unit owners that could be enacted in conjunction
with the main Act or as a stand-alone law." 20 8 Surprisingly, although
an excellent "discussion," the UCIOA appears to be adopted in a
mere three states: Vermont, Connecticut and Delaware, with recent
introduction in Mississippi as of 201 1.209 As such, additional research
is needed to see if there are gaps in the UCIOA covered by other acts,
or the Restatement, or if the UCIOA can be viewed as a truly uniform
system that should be more closely examined by a larger portion of
the country. Nevertheless, the UCIOA's drafters were diligent in
fashioning a widely applicable standard for condominium creation
and governance, and in so doing, were possibly successful in crafting
some solutions to these issues.
X. CONCLUSION
Over the last decade, state legislatures and jurists are
identifying and recognizing fiduciary duty issues vis-i-vis real estate
developers, which is a significant improvement over prior decades.
However, there is much more work needed to obtain a "uniform"
system or approach to these issues. In light of the Restatement and
other competing judicial viewpoints, it should be incumbent upon the
bench and the bar to create authority that would help shape the law in
this area.
In jurisdictions that do recognize a fiduciary duty, which is an
independent duty of care, courts should also recognize that any tort
claims brought under the duty fall outside the scope of the economic
loss rule. 2 1 This would create a good separation in the courts
between cases that can be brought along a straight-line fiduciary duty
id
id.
2
o9 Id.
210 Davencourt at Pilgrim's Landing Homeowners Ass'n v. Davencourt at
Pilgrim's Landing, LC, 221 P.2d 234, 247 (Utah 2009) (citing Hermansen v.
Tasulis, 48 P.3d 235 (Utah 2002)).
207

208
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claim and those that must stay within traditional contract principles.
Without bright-line rules or tests in fiduciary duty claims, parties and
courts alike will be required as before, to meander their way through
the court system trying to outline and narrow issues, in hopes that the
law will refine itself over time.
Because the Restatement viewpoint is outdated and
antagonistic to actual factual scenarios that are landing in court, the
old methods of solving condominium-developer-purchaser disputes
should not fall to the "usual" risk-shifting analysis that ultimately
requires that buyers shoulder more, and the developer less. Instead,
the parties in control of the funds, permits, and municipal checklists
should be forced to disclose problems, repair defects, sell
condominium developments that are financially viable, and to follow
the rules. Anything less is a recipe for disaster.
Finally, stricter disclosure and recordation requirements put in
place before a condominium declaration is drafted, such as
California's mandate for developer-vendors to publish and draft
documents that are. government cross-checked and offered as "presale" memoranda would go a long way toward avoidance of building
condition and failure-to-disclose issues. If the powers that be were to
couple these changes with a stricter requirement of oversight by title
companies that.close these transactions, then there would be no doubt
that purchasers, lenders, developers and all of those engaged in some
aspect of real estate work, would all be held to an attainable higher
standard.
Where savvy buyers and those less inclined to perform
adequate due diligence are given access to information that the
developer is required to deliver, then both sides can be held to their
losses in the event a project does not go as planned. Conversely,
where municipalities do not require inspections or where they fail to
take action in the pre-closing phase in order to ensure inspections and
building conditions are on par, then the buyer should not be forced to
shoulder the financial burdens of repair and maintenance. More
certainty in the state or municipal requirements of condominium
developers as to timelines, financial contributions, permits,
inspections and deliverables to purchasers would result in a more
informed public, better-qualified participants in the real estate
developer game, and less traffic in the courthouses nationwide.
Although there is certainly more ground to cover in the area of
condominium law, states and local municipal authorities can do
more. There are many states that do not typically use legal counsel in
real estate transactions, and it is accepted that parties need to be more
sophisticated and advised.
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Although reference points such as the Restatement and the
UCIOA are available for road mapping various issues, absent more
states enacting uniform rules for the creation and administration of
condominium property, the law may remain unbalanced on a
nationwide scale. Ultimately, however, where consumers are
informed and advised, and condominium developers are monitored
and forced to put their toes and dollars closer to the line than before,
nearly all parties in the condominium purchase process will be flying
on a higher plane. In the current economy, this transparency could be
nothing but a positive step in the right direction.

